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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC'
has been both valorized and demonized as representing a turn to a positive,
democracy-based theory of the First Amendment. Instead, this Essay looks
at Red Lion principally as a case demonstrating judicial deference to
Congress and to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC or
Commission) decisions in regulating the spectrum commons. The inquiry
takes a granular look at what the FCC has done with public interest content
regulation since the inception of radio. That look reveals administrative
experiments with a variety of public interest interpretations. Specifically,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Many thanks are due to
Mary Coombs, Bernie Oxman, Steve Schnably, and Ralph Shalom for their comments. This
Essay is based on remarks originally presented at the Symposium "Does Red Lion Still
Roar?", on April 18, 2008, at American University-Washington College of Law. All errors
are mine.
1. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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the FCC's experiments reflect four regulatory periods: (1) the "melting
pot" approach; (2) the community representation approach; (3) the
deregulatory, market approach; and (4) the targeted reregulatory approach
principally geared to the protection and education of children.
Through the years, the focus of the interest being protected by FCC
regulation has narrowed considerably. In the melting pot era, the interest
lay in encouraging homogeneous media that served to provide American
society with a single assimilative voice. In the community representation
period, the FCC shifted from trying to encourage a single voice to trying to
preserve the voices of smaller communities within the broader society.
During these first two regulatory eras, the Commission equated the public
interest with community identity, although it defined the notion of
community differently. In the market era, the agency abandoned efforts to
encourage any particular voice and allowed broadcasters more flexibility in
the expectation that the market would prompt stations to provide the
programming desired by the public. That marked a shift in the focus of
regulation from the community to the individual broadcast consumer.
The most recent period of hybrid reregulation is more ambiguous. On
the one hand, the Commission's actions suggest that it has limited its
regulatory focus to the needs of a single constituency-children-and
narrowed its definition of the public interest even beyond the individual
television viewer. The FCC has simultaneously articulated a consumerist,
market approach and exacted what it has claimed to be a limited and
targeted child-related quid pro quo from broadcasters. Looked at
differently, however, the current FCC has used child protection as an
umbrella rationalization for setting the contours of general public
discourse. And it has done so apparently at the behest of conservative
advocacy groups while claiming to have been drafted to regulate by a
general public disgusted with coarse television fare.
The shift in the FCC's focus has been accompanied by technical and
economic developments that have fragmented the market for media
services generally. With the advent of cable television, over-the-air
broadcasters faced many new competitors able to focus on narrower
audience segments. As the blogging phenomenon and websites such as
YouTube have contributed to the growth of Internet media, the market has
become further fragmented. The effect is to leave broadcasters and
newspapers with much smaller audiences and greater financial pressures.2
The fragmentation of media markets has forced broadcasters (as well as
2. See generally PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS
MEDIA 2008 (2008), http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.com/2008 (reporting that broadcasters
are experiencing diminishing audiences while print media outlets are collecting less
classified ad revenue).
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newspapers) to scale back their investments in journalistic resources
substantially.3 Product placement now occurs even on news shows.4
Broadcasters are limiting their focus on investigative journalism5 and
cable's conception of journalism is far closer to what has been called the
"argument culture" than a rich and nuanced notion of journalism.6
Corporate consolidation, public ownership, and Wall Street's focus on
share prices have created further challenges to journalistic norms and
editorial independence.
While the new media environment may well provide a greater variety of
viewpoints and opportunities for self-expression, it does not make up for
the lost resources for traditional journalism. Even while the market for
broadcast media has shrunk, broadcast still has the broadest reach and the
greatest opportunity to create a national dialogue on matters of public
interest.7 This Essay suggests that the public interest currently (and most
sorely) needs a reinvigoration of traditional, searching journalism in the
electronic media. In 1941, the FCC said that "[r]adio can serve as an
instrument of democracy only when devoted to the communication of
information and the exchange of ideas fairly and objectively presented."8
Broadcasting can still serve today as such an instrument of democracy, but
only if it pursues serious, independent journalism (whether or not
"objectively presented"). The enhancement both of the journalistic focus
3. See Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo
Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 683-84 (2007) [hereinafter Levi, A New Model] and
sources cited therein (listing reductions in news organizations' resources for investigative
reporting, research, verification, fact checking, staff, and foreign news bureaus).
4. Stephanie Clifford, A Product's Place Is on the Set, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at
Cl (describing McDonald's coffee cups on morning news anchors' desks).
5. See, e.g., Marisa Guthrie, Investigative Journalism Under Fire, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 23, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6572223.html (citing
conflicts of interest with parent corporations and the growing potential for expensive
lawsuits as economic concerns that limit investigative reporting); Investigative Reporters
Face Time Crunch, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 2, 2008,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6575088.html (citing budget cuts and shorter
viewer attention spans as reasons for spare and shallow investigative reports).
6. See, e.g., BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 139-43
(1st rev. ed. 2007) (noting that one of the driving forces behind the "argument culture" is
that it is less expensive to produce a talk show than it is to do investigative reporting and
deliver news); DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO
DIALOGUE (1998); Levi, A New Model, supra note 3, at 688, 694-96 (listing eight economic
and structural factors that have contributed to "blurring of the distinctions between news and
opinion and between news and entertainment").
7. See, e.g., Anthony E. Varona, Out of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public
Forum Analysis to Redeem American Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
149, 153 (2006) [hereinafter Varona, Out of Thin Air] (stating that free broadcast television
is still "the only conduit to regular news, political information, cultural enrichment,
education, and democratic engagement" for many Americans).
8. Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941).
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and the credibility of mass electronic media should be the current goal of
media policy. This Essay urges the Commission to explore the ways, if
any, in which it can help the electronic mass media develop into credible
journalistic resources.
Yet it is also clear that such a goal cannot be accomplished through the
simple readoption of content controls such as the Fairness Doctrine, for
reasons that have been powerfully articulated in prior scholarship.9 The
question, then, is what the Commission can do-short of traditional
command-and-control interventions-to promote the goal of a strong and
credible electronic press. If the most significant public interest role of
radio and television today could be to provide credible journalism for vast
populations, and if it is true that a market-based conception of the public
interest is unlikely to promote such journalism in today's media
environment, then the Commission can indirectly regulate media structure
to induce more investment in such fare.10 In addition, the Commission
could investigate incentive-based regulation" or expenditure requirements
designed to promote broadcaster investment in news.' 2
9. The Fairness Doctrine was officially adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission in 1949. See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58
(1949) (Report of the Commission). For a recent history of the Fairness Doctrine, see
Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure and
Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 18-
26 (2004) [hereinafter Varona, Changing Channels]. See also Comment, The Regulation of
Competing First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS?, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 1283, 1284-86 (1974) (discussing the operation of the Fairness Doctrine). For
sources criticizing the Fairness Doctrine, see infra note 140.
10. For others who suggest structural regulation to enhance news and journalism, see
C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS
(2007); and Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the First Amendment, and
Democracy's Future, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2008).
11. For a discussion of the benefits of subsidy-based media regulation, see, for
example, Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention
Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389 (2004), and
Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of Government
Subsidies to Regulate New Media, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217 (2002). But see
Candeub, supra note 10, at 1554 (expressing doubts about the wisdom of government
speech subsidies).
12. See, e.g., Lili Levi, In Search of Regulatory Equilibrium, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1321
(2007) (proposing regulations that require broadcasters to spend a certain percentage of
advertising revenue on "public affairs production and programming"). This is not an
argument that the First Amendment requires the government to improve the speech
marketplace. Nor is it to say that journalistic values are clear and uncontroverted, or that we
can be certain about what particular regulations are likely to enhance the journalistic
enterprise, or that it would be easy to determine whether the Commission's interventions
have been successful, or even that indirect, incentive-based regulations don't raise
troublesome questions about government-pressured speech. See, e.g., Levi, A New Model,
supra note 3, at 677-80 (discussing internal limits on journalistic standards); see also
Candeub, supra note 10 (expressing doubts about nonstructural content regulation).
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Thus, this Essay argues that instead of completely abandoning public
interest regulation or simply limiting it to purportedly child-protective
interventions, it is now an opportune moment for the FCC to investigate a
refrained return to the early, community-building conception of the public
interest-but with a very different regulatory focus and alternative
regulatory methods. 13 This inquiry would be useful, even considering prior
agency failures to preserve the public interest and concerns admitted below
about the apparent politicization of the Commission today.' 4 Numerous
critics flatly reject the viability of public interest broadcast regulation. 15
However, a Commission inquiry could be a catalyst to public debate. Such
a debate could be useful in itself. And it might have some impact on the
Commission.16 Moreover, the discussion might engage more than media
activists. Depending on the nature of the proposed regulations,
broadcasters would not necessarily oppose them. Their position would
likely depend on a number of factors that cannot be analyzed in advance
and in the abstract. Issues such as their perception of other regulatory
needs at the time and whether they think they can benefit from the
proposed rules are likely to be significant factors. 17 All this is to say that
13. Of course, any product of Commission rulemaking following an inquiry would
likely be challenged in court. While some D.C. Circuit panels have been skeptical even of
structural media regulation in recent years, there are reasons to think that at least some
regulations might survive scrutiny: Red Lion still remains; some on the Supreme Court
continue to be swayed by historical arguments for regulation in the broadcast context; the
D.C. Circuit's interest in empirical evidence of problems and metrics to judge the adequacy
of regulatory responses can be satisfied; and content-neutral spectrum fee-type suggestions
to promote journalism would not necessarily be inconsistent even with the D.C. Circuit's
purportedly new approach to Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
review.
14. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
16. An inquiry can serve as a salutary invitation to public engagement. If a
Commission inquiry is taken seriously by the public and engages people interested in media
policy, the Commission will be faced both with much to think about in the responses
generated by its inquiry and with the public pressure generated by the responses.
Admittedly, critics have complained that the Commission does not seriously entertain public
comment on its regulatory initiatives. E.g., Mary M. Underwood, Comment, On Media
Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Notice and Agency Consideration of Comments, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 185, 200-06 (2008); cf STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS: THE PosSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 125-33 (2008).
However, "few agency decisions with significant stakes escape public attention or
participation completely." CROLEY, supra, at 292. One example-the public response to
the agency's 2003 ownership deregulation proposals-has clearly been noticed by the
Commission. For a description of the grassroots movement to reform modem media in the
context of the battle over the FCC's attempt to roll back some of its media ownership rules
in 2003, see, for example, THE FUTURE OF MEDIA: RESISTANCE AND REFORM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (Robert McChesney et al. eds., 2005).
17. If, for example, some important broadcasters think that a reputation as an excellent
and credible news source is valuable as part of their branding, but if that reputation is not
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we cannot necessarily assume that the political context today will lead to
the same results as in the market era. Perhaps it is time to revive and
rethink the public interest for radio and television.
I. READING RED LION
Red Lion is the Supreme Court's most famous and most controversial
statement of the FCC's role in public interest regulation.' 8 Many scholarly
admirers of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo19 have rejected the
First Amendment exceptionalism with which the Red Lion Court appeared
to treat broadcast content regulation.20  They focus on the failure of the
scarcity rationale to justify content-based regulation of speech.21
Yet scarcity in the obvious sense of a limited physical resource does not
worth a financial investment much larger than that made by competitors, then the imposition
of requirements that would place all broadcasters on an equal footing might reduce the
comparative disparity in losses.
18. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under
Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 955, 955 (2007) (describing Red Lion as probably the
Court's "most famous broadcasting case").
19. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (finding that a state's right-of-reply statute for
newspapers violated the First Amendment).
20. For discussions of broadcast exceptionalism, see, for example, LEE C. BOLLINGER,
IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 85-90 (1991); THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 262-63 (1994); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987); ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX
OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 7-18 (1986);
Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech Curriculum Ignores
Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 Mo. L. REv. 59 (2005); Lee C.
Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Jim Chen, Conduit-Based
Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1403 & n.310 (2005); Thomas W. Hazlett,
Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 908,
926-30 (1997) [hereinafter Hazlett, Physical Scarcity]; Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic
First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899 (1998); Matthew L. Spitzer,
Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1349 (1985); Varona,
Changing Channels, supra note 9; Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 1101, 1106 (1993); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-
Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003); see also William W.
Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.
L. REv. 539, 574 (1978) (arguing that even if the Red Lion result is constitutionally
defensible, it may still have been "a [F]irst [A]mendment misfortune").
21. For the seminal attack on broadcast scarcity as a justification for differential
regulation, see R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1,
12-17 (1959). As Dean Jim Chen has characterized the critics, "Dissatisfaction with Red
Lion has spawned an academic cottage industry." Chen, supra note 20, at 1403 & n.310
("No one besides the Supreme Court actually believes the scarcity rationale.") and sources
cited therein; see also Yoo, supra note 20, at 267-69 (explaining the "Analytical Emptiness
of Scarcity").
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capture the core of Red Lion.22 Red Lion is most usefully understood as a
case of deference to Congress and expert agencies in addressing the
allocation of rights in a commons.23 As Professor C. Edwin Baker has
22. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Liberating Red Lionfrom the Glass Menagerie of Free Speech
Jurisprudence, I J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 299 (2002) ("Careful examination of
Red Lion . . . reveals no fewer than three distinct justifications for tailoring [F]irst
[A]mendment protection according to the characteristics of a specific conduit."); Ellen P.
Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at War with Itself, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211, 1226 (2007) ("Red Lion's analysis obscured the importance of
market structure to the analysis by relying on the poorly conceived spectrum scarcity
rationale."); Richard E. Labunski, May It Rest in Peace: Public Interest and Public Access
in the Post-Fairness Doctrine Era, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 219, 268-69 (1989)
(reading RedLion as "based on the principle that restricted access entitles the government to
regulate"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of
Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1659-60 (1998) (describing-albeit questioning-Red
Lion as an example of "the Supreme Court's deference to regulations that it can characterize
as market-structuring rather than ideological").
Some ground public interest regulation of broadcast content on notions of public
property. Spectrum Management Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. 37, 46 (1997) (statement of Reed Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n)
(testifying that public ownership justifies public interest obligations for broadcasters); see
also Robinson, supra note 20, at 911-12 (discussing the public property argument). Yet
others link Red Lion to the doctrine of public fora. See, e.g., Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting
Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast
Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1708 (1997); Varona, supra note 7. Still others rely on a
quid pro quo argument to justify regulation. See, e.g., Michael M. Epstein, Broadcast
Technology as Diversity Opportunity: Exchanging Market Power for Multiplexed Signal
Set-Asides, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3 (2006). Professor Monroe Price, in describing the
perspectives of early radio policymakers (such as Herbert Hoover), points to the following
view:
Here, the scarce commodity is not spectrum, but rather information and culture; its
supply should not be controlled in ways that might be abusive, and access to it should
be rendered in ways that are just .... Much of the early rhetoric . . . reflected a
patrician sense of national purpose and national propriety....
For [Hoover] and his colleagues, it was the power of radio, not just the scarcity of
spectrum, that motivated concern for the new technology's relationship to American
democracy. The right of an individual to use the ether was a privileged access to a
kind of public magic, conferred upon condition.
MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 161-62
(1995).
23. The need to regulate to stave off commons problems is not unique to broadcasting.
For the classic description of the tragedy of an unregulated commons, see Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). We have a tradition of the Public
Trust Doctrine in aspects of property law. For a seminal article on the Public Trust
Doctrine in the environmental context, see, for example, Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970). Long-established precedents permit price regulation of businesses affected with a
public interest. E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). Professor Carol Rose has also
written about the seeds in common law of protection for "inherently public property." Carol
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 721-23 (1986). Some have argued for expanding the Public Trust
Doctrine to the electromagnetic spectrum. E.g., Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-
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explained, broadcast frequencies present the problem of the commons:
"[T]he limited availability of a valuable resource (scarcity of land or
broadcast frequencies), combined with the absence of some form of
governmental (or social) allocation of usage rights, results in overuse,
making the resource worthless to everyone. 24  The Red Lion Court
recognized that when the government is faced with the possibility of a
tragedy of the commons, it has the obligation to regulate. Under those
circumstances, the Constitution allows broad deference to both
congressional and administrative decisions about the way to do so. The
Red Lion Court read the First Amendment as allowing a significant amount
Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic
Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004). See also Thomas B. Nachbar,
The Public Network, 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1009641 (arguing that the Public Trust
Doctrine could be a useful analytic approach to deal with issues of net neutrality).
The question, of course, is whether the legal categories used in other contexts
implicating commons problems can simply be translated into the context of content
regulation in communications. In 1929, for example, an article in the Yale Law Journal
discussed the possibility that Federal Radio Commission regulatory power could be
grounded on the doctrine of businesses affected with a public interest:
Broadcasting possesses enough of the elements commonly required so that the courts
may label it as such if they so desire. It is a business of greatest importance to the
public; it is not one where competition will protect the public interest; it may even be
said that it has been "granted" or "devoted" to the use of the public.... Yet . . . they
[the courts] do not appear ever to have used the doctrine to justify such a strict
regulation as the requirements of radio would seem to demand. The device was used
originally for fixing rates .... And the regulation permitted under it has never
proceeded much beyond this ....
Julius Henry Cohen et al., Comment, Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J.
245, 254 n.46 (1929). This doctrinal reading may have continued, but it is also useful to
observe along with Eben Moglen, that broadcasters have been thought to be businesses
affected with a public interest "because they have become essential social facilities. As far
as broadcasters are concerned, the public interest is that they are the primary news
distribution system for all but a few." Eben Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 945, 951 (1997).
24. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57, 102 (1994). Additionally, Professor Baker notes that
[t]his chaos/commons quality arguably provides the best understanding both of
federal intervention in broadcasting and of the Court's opinions in crucial cases such
as [Red Lion]. The standard view-which may be more easily described, but which
is also more vulnerable to savage and effective critique-is that an inherent scarcity
of broadcast frequencies justified government regulation.
C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 861
n. 114 (2002) [hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration].
25. Justice Frankfurter recognized that need to regulate in another seminal early
broadcasting case as well. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) ("Unlike
other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be
denied.").
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of leeway for congressional and administrative interpretations of the First
Amendment in circumstances in which there is no choice but to regulate.
While a licensing regime is not the only permissible regulatory solution,26
Congress is not precluded from choosing such a regime.27 And when it
does so, it is not precluded from choosing to make allocations reflect more
than mere purchasing power.28 As the Court put it in Red Lion, "Where
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual
to speak, write, or publish., 29 The Red Lion Court's assertion that "[i]t is
26. Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 561-65. The Court later said in CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee that "once it was accepted that broadcasting was subject to
regulation, Congress was confronted with a major dilemma: how to strike a proper balance
between private and public control." 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973). Some have argued that a
property rights solution would have been preferable. E.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, A Law &
Economics Approach to Spectrum Property Rights: A Response to Weiser and Hatfield, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 975 (2008); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of
the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990). But see Philip J. Weiser & Dale
Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 549 (2008). The Court in Red Lion stated that
[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
from the airwaves.
395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). See also Henry Geller, Turner Broadcasting The First
Amendment, and the New Electronic Delivery Systems, I MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1995), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volone/geller.pdf
27. See Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of "Place" in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2621 (2007) ("[W]hat is perhaps
most important in the context of broadcasting cases is the recognition that the First
Amendment can protect speakers from being drowned out by other non-state speakers.").
28. As the Court explained in Red Lion,
Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a broadcaster to
permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing controversial
issues, or to require that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be
given a chance to communicate with the public. Otherwise, station owners and a few
networks would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest
bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and
candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed. There is no
sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a
medium not open to all. "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests."
395 U.S. at 392 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 387. As the Court further said,
No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency;
to deny a station license because "the public interest" requires it "is not a denial of
free speech." By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned those
who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license
permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who
2008]
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the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount" 30 follows in situations where the public, for
noneconomic reasons, does not have access to the means of
communication.31
The deference granted by the Red Lion Court gives the political branches
the space to work out regulatory schemes in evolving industries within
boundaries established by the Court.32 This is not to say, however, that the
Court's recognition of the need for government regulation in an evolving
industry that precludes open access necessarily implies judicial acceptance
of regulatory carte blanche. Even when the Court recognized the need for
FCC regulation in NBC, Inc. v. United States, it nevertheless cautioned that
Commission license-allocation decisions grounded on particular viewpoints
were impermissible.33 Since 1927, the Communications Act has precluded
administrative agency "censorship" (admittedly without defining the
term). 34  The Supreme Court has recognized that the Commission and
holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
from the airwaves. Because of.the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in
free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
Id. at 389-90.
30. Id. at 390.
31. Thus, Red Lion need not be read as the Supreme Court's announcement of a
fundamental turn from an autonomy-based interpretation of the First Amendment.
32. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 48 n.88 (1994) (characterizing the reasoning of Red
Lion, Turner Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, and Tornillo as "makeweight" and suggesting that
the decisions "can best be reconciled by reference to the 'paramount importance' to the
Court 'of according substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress"')
(citation omitted). The Eskridge and Frickey article describes law as the product of "a
balance of competing institutional pressures" that produces a "stable equilibrium when no
implementing institution is able to interpose a new view without being overridden by
another institution." Id. at 32. Thus, the Court's deference to Congress in the broadcast
context, by contrast to its lack of deference to state legislatures in the print context, may be
explained by the nature of the interdependent institutional relationships rather than in purely
doctrinal or even policy terms.
33. The Court stated that
Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants upon the
basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis.
If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among
applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly different.
NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
34. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091 (1934)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000)) ("Nothing in this Act shall be understood
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broadcasters walk a "tightrope ' 35 in attempting both to maintain the
Commission's role as regulator in the public interest and the licensee's
journalistic freedom. The agency views itself as following this articulated
path.36 The bounded deference granted to the FCC is reflected in the less-
than-strict degree of scrutiny applied by the Court in its constitutional
review of broadcast cases.
Why focus on Red Lion principally as a deference case in the mold of
other post-New Deal judicial-deference cases 37 rather than as the avatar of
a new direction in First Amendment interpretation generally? 38 Principally
or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station."); Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
§ 29, 44 Stat. 1162 1172-73 (1927) (repealed 1934); see also Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 37 (1967).
Professor Kalven recognizes that physical signal interference requires broadcast licensing,
but asks what the implications are.
The fact is obvious but the crucial question is: What exactly follows from it? Does a
rational licensing policy require that the Commission to some extent consider the
service, that is, the kind and quality of the communications furnished? Does it
therefore follow ... that because of the brute fact of licensing, the traditions of the
First Amendment cannot help the broadcaster?
If this were true, there would be no regulation of content which would not be within
the Commission's powers so long as it was not grossly arbitrary and capricious. And
interestingly enough the Commission itself has never claimed this degree of
jurisdiction. It has always publicly embraced a position against "censorship."
Further, Section 326 prohibiting censorship must refer to something; that is, there
must be some regulation which the Commission might try that would defeat the
intention of Congress.
My thesis is that the traditions of the First Amendment do not evaporate because
there is licensing.
Id.
35. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (indicating that the
"role of the Government as an 'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public
interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic 'free agent' call for a delicate balancing"
and requires "both the regulators and the licensees to walk a 'tightrope' to preserve the First
Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act").
36. See Commission Programing [sic] Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2313 (1960) (Report
and Statement of Policy) (en banc) (explaining that the Commission sought to "chart a
course between the need of arriving at a workable concept of the public interest in station
operation, on the one hand, and the prohibition laid on it by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States... on the other").
37. Recent accounts of administrative law describe the post-New Deal deference of
courts to administrative agencies as part of a belief in expertise-based governance models.
See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007). Even for later courts skeptical of
the ability of expertise as such to solve social problems, there has been a tendency to defer
to congressional decisions to act through administrative agencies especially in situations
where the necessity of regulation is clear. For another recent article describing the Supreme
Court's broadcasting cases in terms of deference, see Gregory P. Magarian, The
Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to
the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185, 202
(2007).
38. For examples of constitutional theorists who have argued that the First Amendment
permits government intervention to enhance speech markets, see BAKER, supra note 10, at
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because it is an enabling decision-it does not tell the FCC what to do by
way of public interest regulation. The Court does not say that the Fairness
Doctrine is constitutionally mandated. It even admits the possibility that
the passage of time, changed technology, or better evidence of a chilling
effect of regulation on licensee speech might lead to a contrary result.
39
Nor does the case mandate a new and listener-focused view of the First
Amendment.4 ° Instead, it defers to administrative choices made to
counteract monopoly when the access to speakers that would ordinarily be
expected from a communicative medium is foreclosed for reasons other
than the speakers' inability to pay. It allows a government regulatory
agency to remain neutral with regard to speech content even after it has
chosen speakers to license.41  This reading of Red Lion maintains the
decision's vitality and ensures that the FCC has regulatory flexibility to
identify and respond to the right objects of media policy today.
124-62; OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); CASs R. SuNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 354, 384 (1999); and Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783
(1987).
39. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969); see also FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378-79 n.12 (1984) ("[Wlere it to be shown by the
Commission that the Fairness Doctrine '[has] the net effect of reducing rather than
enhancing' speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our
decision in [Red Lion]." (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
40. The Court in Red Lion said that
[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed
on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee.
395 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted).
41. Another way of looking at Red Lion is to say that it is a case in which the Court
finds that the Constitution does not stop Congress and its agency from deciding to legislate
governmental neutrality among ideas. In other words, having selected one applicant for the
license could be perceived as the government's authorizing or standing behind or
associating itself with the licensee's viewpoints or editorial choices. By requiring
something like the Fairness Doctrine, and perhaps even a right of access, the government
would be untangling itself from the promotion of a particular licensee's editorial choices or
viewpoints. It would effectively be trying to establish a neutral governmental association as
between different views. Having made the quality judgments in the initial licensing
process, the Commission is permitted (by the Court's reading of the First Amendment in
Red Lion) to distance itself to some degree from its chosen licensees by imposing a version
of an access regime based on proxy or trustee notions.
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II. A GRANULAR APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC INTEREST
BROADCAST CONTENT REGULATION
Much of the literature addressing FCC content management in the public
interest is very critical. For a variety of reasons, FCC critics have
proclaimed that public interest regulation has been-and perhaps would
inevitably be-a "dismal failure. 'A2  Critics challenge public interest
regulation as such because of the breadth and vagueness of the concept; the
wide discretion it grants the FCC; its fundamentally political character; its
prior failures; and the constitutional tension it implicates.43 But what else
can be learned from how the agency has interpreted its mandate? 44 What is
the metastory of public interest content regulation by the FCC since the
1920s?
History shows that the FCC's public interest regulation has been far
42. See, e.g., Varona, Out of Thin Air, supra note 7, at 149, 163 (noting the FCC's
failure to enforce public interest programming requirements); Varona, Changing Channels,
supra note 9, at 52-89 (assessing the FCC's failure to define the public interest standard);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2102 (1997); Glen 0.
Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs,
64 VA. L. REV. 169, 193-96 (1978); Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics
Are Local: A Response to Christopher Yoo 's Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J.
233 (2004) [hereinafter Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local]. See also
Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 20, at 944 (1997) (describing broadcast regulation not
as an effective response to market failure, but "driven by the rents available to licensees on
the one side, and the gains available to political actors from the influence over a medium of
pervasive social importance on the other").
43. See infra, notes 140-46 and accompanying text. As early as 1928, for example, the
FRC noted that its delegated power to regulate in the public interest, convenience, and
necessity was subject to critique. 2 FRC ANN. REP. 166 (1928), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN BROADCASTING 127, 129 (2d. ed. Frank J. Kahn ed., 1973) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS]. One of the critiques was that the standard was too broad and gave too much
discretion to the Commission. Id. See also Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public
Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295
(1930), cited in HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW 116, 116 n.9
(1999). Scholarship that focuses on the political aspects and explanations for what the
Commission has done in the name of the public interest include SUSAN L. BRINSON, THE
RED SCARE, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1941-1960
(Praeger 2004); and ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF
BROADCAST REGULATION (1973). See also ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra, at 117 ("The nature of
the public interest has fluctuated in part because of the political outlook of those who
administer the law .... As former FCC Commissioner Ervin Duggan put it, 'successive
regimes at the FCC have oscillated wildly between enthusiasm for the public interest
standard and distaste for it."'). Monroe Price has described the "laborious, inconsistent
work" of developing a meaning of the public interest standard as "a product of interactions
between the Commission, the industry it regulated, Congress, the courts, and the White
House." PRICE, supra note 22, at 163.
44. According to a major communications law hombook, "[o]ne thing that all
[conservative and liberal critics] can agree on ... is that the meaning of the 'public interest'
has changed over time." ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 117.
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from unitary. In fact, the idea of "public interest" or "public trustee"
regulation of the media (particularly in the context of programming) has
undergone a series of four transformations-at least in the Commission's
rhetoric-since the birth of radio. The FCC's decisions about broadcast
programming reflects four approaches: (1) the melting pot approach; (2)
the community representation approach; (3) the market approach; and (4)
the targeted, hybrid regulatory approach.45
A. The "Melting Pot" Approach
Although the Commission's statutory invitation to regulate in the
"public interest, convenience and necessity" has never been statutorily
defined,46 the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and the FCC began their
regulatory interventions assuming a substantive vision of the public interest
grounded on a particular view of the social and political role of radio.47 A
review of both the programming rules and the rhetoric of this early period
shows that the FRC and FCC saw radio as appealing to a broad audience
and promoting a common culture to serve a homogenizing and unifying
social role; providing programming that would take advantage of the ability
of radio to create mass access and a mass audience; serving, not as an
opinionated speaker itself, but as the conduit for speech and entertainment
geared to the mass audience; and responsible for the public interest station
by station, not market by market. The early regulators saw radio as the
basis of a shared national culture-a way of establishing national
narratives.48 They had a conception of "a public, separated from the
government, separated from specific persons, that has the right of
45. For an account that categorizes the history of public interest regulation as dividing
along a democracy model and an efficiency model, see Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law
as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 371, 387-89 (2006).
46. Early on, the public interest standard was described as "a supple instrument for the
exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its
legislative policy." FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
47. It is true, however, that there was a significant shift in the early days of radio
regarding how best to effectuate that vision of the public interest. Specifically, American
radio began with an adamant prohibition of advertising. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE
MEDIA 338 (2004). Within a short period of time, advertising-supported commercial radio
was touted as the best way of accomplishing the public interest goals of benefiting the
listening public. Id. at 338-39, 354-57. This is not inconsistent with the notion that the
Commission sought to promote a particular goal, however. Rather, it represents a shift in
attitude and prediction about what methods would likely best promote the goal.
48. PRICE, supra note 22, at 10, 19, 158, 160, 163. Professor Price has concluded that
"[w]ithout hyperbole, it could be said that the history of [U.S.] broadcasting involved the
creation of a more homogeneous United States out of its culturally dissimilar and previously
antagonistic parts." Id. at 19.
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expression. ' 49 The development of radio as a commercial, nation-building
instrument was not, however, a "natural," uncontested result of legislative
and public consensus. Rather, it flowed from legislative and administrative
choices rejecting a noncommercial communications regime advocated in
the early 1920s.50
What demonstrates this? In its 1929 Third Annual Report, the FRC,
predecessor of the FCC, took the position that "the public interest dictated a
preference for stations serving the general public rather than stations
serving 'private or selfish interests."-'5' The agency said so, at least in part,
to justify its spectrum-allocation decisions that effectively favored
commercial broadcasters over stations with educational, religious, or civic
missions.52 The interests of the listening public would be promoted by
commercial stations because such stations, "were interested in obtaining
the largest possible audience, while nonprofit stations served only
particular groups such as students or members of a church. A commercial
station would present alternative views on a subject, while a nonprofit
would naturally tend only to present its own perspective.
'
"
53
The Commission during those years characterized commercial,
advertising-supported stations as "general public service stations., 54  It
stated that licensees serving the public interest were stations seeking to
serve "the entire listening public within the listening area of the station.,
55
49. Id. at 164.
50. See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, at 5
(1993) (providing "a revisionist interpretation of American broadcasting history, one that
regards the emerging status quo [of corporate, commercial, advertiser-supported radio] as
the product of an intense and multifaceted political fight with obvious winners and losers,
not as the 'natural' American system or as the product of consensus").
51. STARR, supra note 47, at 351; see also 3 FRC ANN. REP. (1929), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 136 [hereinafter FRC 1929 ANNUAL REPORT]. This position
echoed the statements by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover at the Fourth
National Radio Conference in 1925: "The ether is a public medium and its use must be for
public benefit .... The dominant element for consideration in the radio field is, and always
will be, the great body of the listening public, millions in number, countrywide in
distribution." Herbert Hoover, Sec'y, Dep't of Commerce, Opening Address Before the
Fourth National Radio Conference (Nov. 9-11, 1925), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATION OF RADIO 7
(1926), available at http://earlyradiohistory.us/1925conf.htm.
52. See STARR, supra note 47, at 351 (discussing spectrum allocation); and
MCCHESNEY, supra note 50, at 26-27 (noting that the Third Annual Report departs from the
previous 1928 Annual Report, inter alia, by distancing itself from the prior report's
antipathy toward advertising).
53. STARR, supra note 47, at 352.
54. Id.
55. FRC 1929 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 34, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra
note 43, at 136; MCCHESNEY, supra note 50, at 27.
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The FRC called for each licensed station to air a balanced or "well-rounded
program, in which entertainment, consisting of music of both classical and
lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, important public events,
discussions of public questions, weather, market reports, and news, and
matters of interest to all members of the family find a place.
'5 6
56. Great Lakes Broad. Co., FRC ANN. REP. 32 (1929), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
Great Lakes Broad. v. FRC, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706
(1930), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 136.
[T]he emphasis is on the listening public, not on the sender of the message. It
would not be fair, indeed it would not be good service, to the public to allow a
one-sided presentation of the political issues of a campaign. In so far as a
program consists of discussion of public questions, public interest requires ample
play for the free and fair competition of opposing views, and the [C]ommission
believes that the principle applies not only to addresses by political candidates but
to all discussions of issues of importance to the public.
Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 FRC ANN. REP. at 33. See also DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at
139 (rearticulating the goal of a "well-rounded program best calculated to serve the greatest
portion of the population in the region to be served"); FRC 1929 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 51, at 32-35.
There would subsequently be some variations in the way in which the Commission
would characterize and measure such service, but one key element remained constant. The
FRC originally said that it did not "propose to erect a rigid schedule" for various types of
programming and articulated its "confidence in the sound judgment of the listening
public ... as to what type of programs are in its own best interest" in 1929. Id. at 34-35;
DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 136. At other points, the agency became a bit more specific,
providing lists of programming categories deemed likely to serve the public interest-
thereby suggesting the appropriateness of some level of programming macromanagement by
the key commonality remained the Commission's belief that the public would benefit from
general public service stations rather than stations advancing any particular points of view.
The agency staff prepared what came to be called the Blue Book in 1946. The Blue
Book called for licensees to devote an adequate amount of time to issues of public concern,
to air a reasonable number of sustaining rather than sponsored programs (meaning programs
paid for by the station rather than an advertising sponsor), and to identify the programming
they aired in six identified categories. FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE
RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 12-39 (Mar. 7, 1946) [hereinafter Blue Book].
The Blue Book was occasioned by FCC Chairman Paul Porter's recognition that the FCC
had been issuing license renewals for stations "even in cases where there [was] a vast
difference between promises [about programming] and performance." Harry Cole & Patrick
Murck, The Myth of the Localism Mandate: A Historical Survey of How the FCC's Actions
Belie the Existence of a Governmental Obligation to Provide Local Programming, 15
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 339, 350 (2007) (quoting Porter speech to National Association of
Broadcasters in 1945). While the Blue Book began from the proposition that "[p]rimary
responsibility for the American system of broadcasting" is left to the licensees and
networks, it nevertheless sketched out a rather detailed vision of appropriate programming.
Blue Book, supra, at 54; see also Varona, Changing Channels, supra note 9, at 21 and
sources cited therein. The industry reaction to the Blue Book was at best mixed, and the
Commission itself neither adopted the report nor repudiated it. DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 739 (5th ed. 1990).
The next FCC attempt to address programming was the Commission's 1960 En'Banc
Programing Inquiry Statement-probably the most detailed of the Commission's
instructions to broadcasters about their content obligations. Commission Programing
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (Report and Statement of Policy) (en banc). See also
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The Commission's substantive vision of the public interest at least
implicitly rested on a belief that radio should not cater to the values of
fragmented audiences with potentially conflicting interests but rather
should serve as a homogenizing and unifying creator of shared values.
57
Thus, it prohibited "propaganda stations"-those geared toward sub-
communities of interest (such as labor) or groups with particular points of
view.58 As the agency put it in 1929,
Robinson, supra note 20, at 912 ("The most detailed instructions were contained in the so-
called En Banc Programming [sic] Statement."). In the En Banc Programing Inquiry
Statement, the agency listed fourteen categories of programs generally considered necessary
to serve the public interest:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local talent,
(3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs,
(6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political broadcasts,
(9) agricultural programs, [(10)] news programs, (11) weather and market reports,
(12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups, (14) entertainment programs.
44 F.C.C. at 2314 (1960). See also Varona, Changing Channels, supra note 9, at 22-23.
57. In Great Lakes Broadcasting, for example, the Commission stated that
"[b]roadcasting stations are licensed to serve the public and not for the purpose of furthering
the private or selfish interests of individuals or groups of individuals." Great Lakes Broad.
Co., 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 133. See also
MICHELE HILMES, RADIO VOICES: AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1922-1952 (1997) (focusing
on entertainment programming and discussing the national narratives fostered by radio in its
early years); Cole & Murck, supra note 56, at 339 (arguing, inter alia, that the FRC did not
impose obligations to provide locally oriented programming in the 1920s); STARR, supra
note 47, at 367 (describing the shift from stations with local orientation to stations with
standardized mass entertainment orientation).
58. FRC 1929 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 34 (This language can also be found
in DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 137.). The Commission also stated that because "[tihere is
not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought, religious, political, social, and
economic, each to have its separate broadcasting station, its mouthpiece in the ether," FRC
1929 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 34, it would not license stations focusing on
particular audiences or viewpoints. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 50, at 28, 66-67, 70
(describing the FRC's refusal to extend hours of operation for nonprofit "Voice of Labor"
WCFL on the ground that numerous groups-such as Masons or Odd Fellows-might also
"demand the exclusive use of a frequency for their benefit"); and LOUISE M. BENJAMIN,
FREEDOM OF THE AIR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN
BROADCASTING TO 1935, at 183-84, 185-89 (2001) (describing license renewal fights over
WEVD, a "nonconformist" station providing "service to labor and other minorities ignored
by mainstream stations"). In Professor McChesney's view, the Commission's prohibition of
propaganda stations meant that
ownership by any group not primarily motivated by profit automatically earmarked a
station to the FRC as one with propaganda inclinations....
This interpretation of the public interest, convenience or necessity was a clear
endorsement of the private commercial development of the airwaves .... Even if
propaganda stations attempted to "accompany their messages with entertainment and
other program features of interest to the public," the FRC asserted they did not merit
the same treatment as general public service stations that did the same things since,
among other things, the propaganda stations would be "constantly subject to the very
human temptation not to be fair to opposing schools of thought."
MCCHESNEY, supra note 50, at 27-28 (citation omitted). See also DOCUMENTS, supra note
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There is not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought,
religious, political, social, and economic, each to have its separate
broadcasting station, its mouthpiece of the ether .... Propaganda stations (a
term which is here used for the sake of convenience and not in a derogatory
sense) are not consistent with the most beneficial sort of discussion of public
questions.
5 9
The Commission also signaled its views that some kinds of broadcast
content were inconsistent with the public interest. For a number of years, it
prohibited editorializing by station licensees. 60  The Commission warned
against stations "who consume much of the valuable time allotted to them"
for "matters of a distinctly private nature." 6 1 It refused to renew licenses if
the radio operator was principally using the license as a way to enhance
private nonbroadcast income, challenge mainstream social authority, or
articulate extreme points of view. 62 The agency frowned on the airing of
43, at 137.
59. DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 136-37 (explaining its reasoning as follows: "If
franchises are extended to some it gives them an unfair advantage over others, and results in
a corresponding cutting down of general public service stations. It favors the interests and
desires of a portion of the listening public at the expense of the rest."). See also Erwin G.
Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard- The Search for the Holy
Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 614 (1998) (describing how the Commission "used its
programming regulatory powers cautiously during the 1930s and early 1940s, with the
exception of forcing most of the remaining propaganda stations off the air").
60. In 1941, the Commission explicitly stated in a license renewal decision that "the
broadcaster cannot be an advocate" and that radio stations should not air their own
editorials. Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941). It was almost a decade
later, in 1949, that the Commission eliminated its rule prohibiting editorializing on the air
and adopted the Fairness Doctrine. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1253 (1949) (Report of the Commission). The reversal of the anti-editorializing rule was
apparently opposed by the ACLU, which doubted that the Fairness Doctrine alone would
suffice to check station propaganda. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the
Broadcaster.- Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 772 n.14 (1972).
61. Statement Made by the Commission on August 23, 1928, Relative to Public
Interest, Convenience, or Necessity, 2 FRC ANN. REP. 166, 169 (1928), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 132; STARR, supra note 47, at 365.
62. See, e.g., KFKB Broad. Ass'n v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 670-71 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) (affirming the FRC's denial of renewal to station operated by quack Dr. John
Brinkley to promote his pharmaceutical products and supposedly virility-enhancing
operation of transplanting goat glands into men with sexual problems); Trinity Methodist
Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1932), (affirming the FRC's decision not to
renew the license of Los Angeles station KGEF, owned by Reverend "Fighting Bob"
Schuler, who aired diatribes against local politicians, judges, Jews, and Catholics);
BENJAMIN, supra note 58, at 89-107 (2001). In both the Brinkley and Schuler cases, the
reviewing courts rejected the licensees' contentions that the FRC's actions amounted to
censorship prohibited under the Communications Act. A listeners' poll in 1929 indicated
that Brinkley's station was America's most popular station. STARR, supra note 47, at 365.
Nevertheless, the Commission found that it was operated principally in Brinkley's "personal
interest" and that Brinkley had failed to meet his burden that he was operating in the public
interest. The medical establishment at the time doubtless disapproved of Brinkley.
BENJAMIN, supra note 58, at 90, 92. The FRC's articulated concern in the case that Brinkley
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phonograph records rather than live music. 63 Lotteries and fortune-telling
were also discouraged.64 Thus, early public interest radio regulation
demonstrated particular assumptions about audiences, communities, the
role and possible impact of radio, and the appropriate degree of
government involvement in shaping public discourse.
The Commission's vision was also reflected in the voluntary choices of
broadcasters: "While federal law constrained the diversity of broadcasting
in one way, the ascendancy of the networks curtailed it in another." 65 The
development of radio networks during the early period led to the increasing
airing of national fare.66
was practicing medicine during programs in which he prescribed his patent medicines for
ailments described in listeners' letters may reflect that view. The Schuler case as well
involved nonmainstream programming. The Reverend Shuler defamed public officials
challenging, de facto, local government; his anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic diatribes were
divisive and potentially inflammatory-results at odds with the notion of radio providing a
common culture and national stability. Id. at 107; J. Roger Wollenberg, The FCC as Arbiter
of "The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity," in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 61 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
63. 2 FRC ANN. REP. 166, 168 (1928), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at
130-31. In prohibiting excessive phonograph music, the FRC presumably was trying to
imagine what kinds of new uses the innovative medium could provide for the mass public
that the audience could not find elsewhere. In a statement made in 1928, the FRC said that
the limited facilities for broadcasting should not be shared with stations which give
the sort of service which is readily available to the public in another form. For
example, the public in large cities can easily purchase and use phonograph records of
the ordinary commercial type. A station which devotes the main portion of its hours
of operation to broadcasting such phonograph records is not giving the public
anything which it cannot readily have without such a station .... The [C]ommission
can not close its eyes to the fact that the real purpose of the use of phonograph
records in most communities is to provide a cheaper method of advertising for
advertisers who are thereby saved the expense of providing an original program.
Statement Made by the Commission on August 23, 1928, supra note 61, at 168 (1928),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 127, 130-31.
64. See STARR, supra note 47, at 365.
65. Id. at 367. Those networks were, in themselves, enabled in part as a result of the
spectrum allocation rules adopted by the FRC. Id. at 349, 352-54. This is not to say that
the networks were allowed to develop without any regulation. Rather, structural regulations
designed to curb the power of networks were justified on the ground that excessive network
control of programming would shortchange licensee's ability to transmit local
programming. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
66. Before the late 1920s, there was a profusion of stations with a local orientation.
... Rather than being melded into a mass culture, Americans listening to radio in the
1920s were able to sustain their varied cultural and class identities. The rise of the
networks brought a shift to entertainment created for a national audience: comedy and
variety shows with national celebrities, soap operas, westerns and detective shows, and
sports programs .... Like television in the 1950s, AM network radio in the 1930s (and
after) avoided programming that appealed only to particular cultural groups.
STARR, supra note 47, at 367. See also LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEw DEAL:
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO 1919-1939 (1990), cited in STARR, supra note 47, at 466
n.26.
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This approach to the public interest is consistent with the context in
which radio broadcasting was developing at that time. Paul Starr argues
that in the period after World War I, American society was both more
diverse-with increases in immigration from abroad and migration of
African-Americans to the north-and more reflective of nationalist and
nativist sentiment from those resisting the diversification of the country.6 7
National programming that would promote assimilation rather than
fragmentation could be a useful response at a time when the homogeneity
of the country was breaking down.
Everyone in the early days sounded a common theme about the power of
radio. Then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover set the tone in his
early remarks at the Third National Radio Conference:
Radio has passed from the field of an adventure to that of a public utility.
Nor among the utilities is there one whose activities may yet come more
closely to the life of each and every one of our citizens, nor which holds out
greater possibilities of future influence, nor which is of more potential public
concern....
Radio must now be considered as a great agency of public service .... 68
Thus, he argued that radio was "a public concern impressed with the
public trust and to be considered primarily from the standpoint of public
interest to the same extent and upon the basis of the same general principles
as our other public utilities., 69 At the same time that regulators saw radio's
extraordinary potential, they also feared its potential ill effects. 70 After all,
67. STARR, supra note 47, at 233-35.
68. Herbert Hoover, Sec'y, Dep't of Commerce, Opening Address Before the Third
National Radio Conference (Oct. 6-10, 1924), in RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATION OF
RADIO ADOPTED BY THE THIRD NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCE 2 (1924). See also Hazlett,
Physical Scarcity, supra note 20, at 920 (describing recognition of radio's importance in the
1920s).
69. PRICE, supra note 22, at 160 (quoting Hoover in a 1924 address before Congress).
Professor Price sees the language of the public sphere entering the early conception of the
public airwaves: "for some visionaries, radio was conceived not as a mere medium of
entertainment, not even as a linear extension of the newspaper, but as something wholly
new, a major mechanism for improving the nature of American democracy." Id. According
to Paul Starr, broadcasting "promised to change society. The promise of broadcasting, even
more than earlier media, was to make culture accessible to all, to enable the electorate to
become better informed, to put people instantaneously in touch with the news of the world."
STARR, supra note 47, at 347.
70. In 1926 a congressman stated,
There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good or evil to the
American people as the radio .... [Broadcasting stations] can mold and crystallize
sentiment as no agency in the past has been able to do. If the strong arm of the law
does not prevent monopoly ownership and make discrimination by such stations
illegal, American thought and politics will be largely at the mercy of those who
operate these stations.
PRICE, supra note 22, at 161. See also STARR, supra note 47, at 348 (noting that between
1927 and World War I1, "radio threatened to distort [democracy]" because "there developed
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radio propaganda was instrumental in the war in Europe. 71 Democratic and
progressive legislators, who were critical of the largely conservative
ownership of daily newspapers at the time, feared one-sided radio
representing the conservative views of its owners. 72  Programming
"invaded the sanctity of the home." 73 There was debate about whether
radio should become largely a mainstream commercial medium and
whether advertising would harm the resource.74 The radio operators were
not seen at the time as speakers in their own right. The notion that there
were more potential speakers than stations justified the view that the
licensees-while not common carriers-should program for the public at
large rather than as purveyors of their own views or those of narrower
publics.75
The Judiciary at the time was extremely deferential to the Commission's
decisions.76 After a difficult first year, in which the agency attempted to
operate without a budget and when two of the original Commissioners
died, the FRC began to make "constitutive" allocation and assignment
decisions that aligned the agency's interest with increasingly powerful and
moneyed commercial broadcasters. 77  In exchange for the allocation of
an interdependence between those who held political power ... and those who controlled
radio").
71. See NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 228 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
("Events in Europe show that radio may readily be a weapon of authority and
misrepresentation, instead of a means of entertainment and enlightenment. It may even be
an instrument of oppression."); see also STARR, supra note 47, at 342 (noting that the Nazis
"centralized [broadcasting] control under their Ministry of Propaganda" and that during the
1930s "[t]hroughout continental Europe, governmental supervision of broadcasting became
the rule, even where the stations were normally in the hands of private corporations").
72. See STARR, supra note 47, at 350 (discussing southern and western congressmen's
perception of networks as "a new form of northeastern cultural domination"); cf Colin
Vandell, Words Signifying Nothing? The Evolution of§ 315(a) in an Age of Deregulation
and Its Effect on Television News Coverage of Presidential Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 443, 446 (2005) (explaining that "[t]he impetus for campaign coverage
regulation provisions ... came from emerging fears in Congress during the 1920s that radio
networks had too much unilateral influence over national elections").
73. STARR, supra note 47, at 364.
74. Id. at 338, 353-56, 363. See generally THE FUTURE OF MEDIA, supra note 16.
75. Professor Price has suggested that this kind of perspective reflected seeds of a
Habermasian conception of the public sphere in the early regulatory environment. See
generally PRICE, supra note 22.
76. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850, 851
(D.C. Cir. 1932) (affirming the FRC's refusal to renew appellant's license "[on] the ground
that the public interest, convenience, and/or necessity would not be served by the granting of
the application"); KFKB Broad. Ass'n v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1931) (affirming the FRC's refusal to renew physician's broadcasting license on the finding
that his broadcasts were not in the public interest and noting that "we do not think that it was
the intent of Congress that we should disturb the action of the [Clommission in a case like
the present").
77. STARR, supra note 47, at 350.
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spectrum, these broadcasters promised to operate in the general public
interest. 78  This convenient quid pro quo protected both the large
commercial broadcasters from the potential competition from other
entrants, and the Commission, whose view of the public interest coincided
with the provision of mainstream fare at the highest available level of
broadcast quality for the listening audience. Although the Commission's
specific programming pronouncements during this period may not in fact
79have been the most significant determinants of broadcast programming,
the media structure that the government chose and the Commission's
rhetorical directive to commercial broadcasters were most consistent with
audience aggregation, whether at the local or national level.
B. The Community Representation Approach
Starting in the 1960s and peaking in the 1970s, the FCC changed its
articulation of how licensees should satisfy their public interest
programming obligations, although the agency showed some ambivalence
about its role in policing the public interest.80 During this period, the
Commission began to articulate the public interest as more clearly a
representational notion rather than a category to be defined either by the
FCC or by broadcasters in tandem with advertisers seeking to please the
tastes of the general audience. Rather, the Commission emphasized the
broadcaster's obligation to ascertain the needs of its audience-including
subaudiences-and to program responsivelysi This suggests recognition
78. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 50, at 18-29 (discussing the FRC's 1928
"reallocation of the airwaves" and its interpretation of public interest, convenience, or
necessity); Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 20, at 931 ("[T]he objective of
broadcasters in lobbying for licensing legislation was to exclude new entrants while
maintaining existing frequency rights .... It was correctly augured that the public interest
standard would create a constitutional basis for legally denying such entry.").
79. For example, Former Commissioner Glen Robinson articulates a skeptical view of
the Commission's commitment to the program standards it adopted in the 1960 En Banc
Programing Inquiry Statement:
The list [of desired programming] is remarkable for its comprehensiveness, but more
so for its irrelevance, for it was never meaningfully enforced. Though the 1960 En
Banc Programming [sic] Statement remains the official statement of programming
policy, the Commission has never bothered to bring it up to date, probably because it
recognizes that it never was in touch with reality.
Robinson, supra note 20, at 913.
80. I take the Commission's failure to enforce program standards during this period,
see id., as evidence of regulatory ambivalence. For a more detailed discussion of this point,
see infra note 86.
81. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals later described it,
Over the years, the Commission had developed detailed procedures for licensees to
follow in order to determine the needs and interests of the communities served and so
to provide responsive programming. The requirements included compiling
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by the Commission-at least in its rhetoric-both of the diversity of
broadcast audiences and the notion that their interests should be served
even if the unregulated, advertising-driven broadcast market would not
independently generate responsive programming. The Commission's rules
also began to focus more on the process by which public affairs
programming would be created than the overall programming mix-both
entertainment and nonentertainment-that the Commission thought would
lead to overall broadcasting in the public interest. Moreover, the rhetoric
was localY
A central piece of evidence suggesting this development is that the
agency moved away from program categories to issue-responsive
programming. 3 It adopted extremely detailed rules for licensees to be able
to determine community needs and problems via formal and informal
ascertainment rules. 84  These ascertainment rules required licensees to
demographic data, conducting public opinion polls, interviewing community leaders,
and developing lists of problems and issues facing the community. See Primer on
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650
(1971), amended 33 F.C.C.2d 394 (1972) [hereinafter Ascertainment Primer].
Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC Ill), 707 F.2d 1413, 1421
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
Hints of this representational approach were evident even in the 1960 En Banc
Programing Inquiry Statement-which succeeded the Blue Book as the Commission's next
significant review of the programming obligations of licensees. Comm'n Programing
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (Report and Statement of Policy) (en banc). There, the
Commission proposed a process of "assiduous planning and consultation" by stations,
including "canvass[ing] the listening public" and a broad variety of community leaders in
order to inform itself of the needs and interests of their licensing communities. Id. at 2316.
Although Commission rhetoric had previously imposed on licensees a general (and vague)
obligation to program in the public interest, the En Bane Programing Inquiry Statement
clearly tied this obligation to programming responsive to ascertained community needs and
interests. The En Bane Programing Inquiry Statement also for the first time explicitly tied
broadcasters' economic interests with the provision of programming desired by the
community-creating a link between programming choices and the market that would later
come to dominate communications policy in the 1980s. Id.
82. See, e.g., PRICE, supra note 22, at 164 (describing the Commission's 1960 report as
emphasizing broadcasters' obligation to identify "the needs of their community" and
suggesting that the report served to create "a false image of the United States as a
congregation of local communities").
83. UCC III, 707 F.2d at 1427, 1430-31. In this review of the Commission's
deregulation of radio, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the Commission's
reorientation from program categories to the notion of issue-responsive programming-
programming responsive to community issues-and approved the shift as a reasonable
reinterpretation of the public interest standard at least in part because programming meeting
the former categories of public interest programming could likely be used to satisfy issue-
responsive programming obligations as well. The court concluded as follows: "In short,
then, while the Commission has clearly reoriented its public interest inquiry away from
categories, the extent and foreseeable consequences of that policy shift should not be
overestimated." Id. at 1431.
84. See Ascertainment Primer, supra note 81, reprinted in DocuMENTs, supra note 43,
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identify and poll the views of significant groups in the licensees' broadcast
areas.85  The licensees would then have to demonstrate that they aired
programming responsive to such identified community problems and
needs. The goal of the ascertainment rules was presumably to displace not
only market-driven licensees, but also the government in the determination
of appropriate programming goals.
With respect to license renewals, the standard appeared to rest on
whether the licensees had satisfied their promises by their performance
during the prior license term. The promise-performance model was
presumably intended to be an accountability mechanism measurable by
objective criteria. It certainly obviated substantive government second-
guessing about programming choices made by the broadcast licensees.
Developments at the agency did not follow a perfectly linear path in one
direction, however. The agency did not enforce either its ascertainment
rules or its license renewal standards very stringently. 86 It also showed
at 316 (setting forth a series of questions and answers "to clarify and provide guidelines as
to Commission policies and requirements"). The D.C. Circuit has explained that the formal
ascertainment rules "were the end-product of many years of policy experimentation by the
Commission. The basic principle underlying ascertainment is clear: For a radio licensee to
provide programming responsive to the issues facing the community, it must first ascertain
just what those issues are." UCC III, 707 F.2d at 1435. At first, in 1960, the FCC "simply
required the broadcaster to provide a statement describing the measures taken and efforts
made 'to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of his community or service
area."' Id. at 1435-36 (citing Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1073 (1981) (Report
and Order)). Thereafter, the Commission "continued to clarify and refine this requirement"
and ultimately issued the 1971 Ascertainment Primer discussed above. UCC III, 707 F.2d at
1436.
85. According to the D.C. Circuit, the Ascertainment Primer
set out the procedures to be followed in determining the demographic composition of
the service area: consulting with community leaders in 19 categories (e.g., business,
minority groups, women's organizations, environmental and consumer groups, etc.);
conducting general public opinion surveys; and then developing a list of community
problems and needs to serve with responsive programming.
Id. at 1436. Former Commissioner Glen Robinson has characterized the ascertainment
approach as follows: "Perhaps the most obviously silly [FCC] endeavor was its erstwhile
policy of requiring licensees to engage in a process known as 'ascertainment of local
needs'-a largely ritualistic exercise the sole redeeming benefit of which was to give the
agency an excuse for not looking at licensees' actual programming." Robinson, supra note
20, at 939 n.158.
86. See Cole & Murck, supra note 56, at 360-61 (describing extensive numbers of
license renewals despite questions regarding the stations' programming in the public
interest). In what may be the most obvious of these cases, the Commission initially
permitted the 1964 renewal of WLBT, a television station in Mississippi, despite clear
evidence of racism in programming, refusals to program for the station's African-American
viewing population, and refusals to provide time for African-American groups to reply to
station editorials. For a description of the events and the Commission's actions, see Office
of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC 1), 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
and Office of Commc'ns of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC 11), 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969). Ultimately, after sixteen years of litigation, the Commission did not renew
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some ambivalence about the Fairness Doctrine. 87 Nevertheless, even if the
the license. See also Sidney A. Shapiro, United Church of Christ v. FCC: Private Attorneys
General and the Rule of Law, 58 ADMiN. L. REv. 939, 946 (2006) (noting that the FCC's
refusal to renew the station's license marked the station as "one of the very few broadcast
licensees ever to lose a license renewal proceeding").
Even though WLBT shows that (in the absence of judicial review) the Commission
tended to renew licenses despite plausible claims that the stations were not programming in
the public interest, it does not undermine the claim in text that the 1960s and 1970s were a
period in which the agency developed the notion of the public interest as community-group
representation. It is important to remember that the WLBT case began in the early 1960s,
that it involved the possibility of license nonrenewal (which the Commission recognized as
a "death sentence" rather than mere punishment), that the Commission did reduce the
duration of the license renewal at one point, that the agency claimed (in what was a
"makeweight" argument, according to Professor Shapiro, id. at 959), that service would
have been lost if the license had not been renewed, and that much of the issue revolved
around standing. In addition to these distinctions, it might well have been the case that the
later shift in the Commission's conception of the public interest was influenced by the
lengthy WLBT saga. Cf Cole & Murck, supra note 56, at 357-58 (characterizing the
Commission during this period as "an ambivalent, if not contradictory, agency" because of
its willingness to impose local programming obligations on licensees while simultaneously
disclaiming authority to involve itself in defining such programming because of concerns
about freedom of speech).
87. On the one hand, the Commission retained the Fairness Doctrine and continued to
employ the rhetoric of balance. There were some highly publicized Fairness Doctrine cases.
On the other hand, the Commission only once attempted to enforce the first prong of the
Fairness Doctrine against a licensee. Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
Moreover, its implementation of the Fairness Doctrine's second prong was limited
as well. For example, the Commission's requirements for a complainant's prima facie case
of Fairness Doctrine violations were procedurally onerous. It did not monitor programming
itself and relied solely on complaints. The agency also used a "good faith" standard
regarding broadcaster showings and required licensees to air balanced viewpoints in their
overall programming rather than within single programs. Indeed, these are some of the
reasons which led critics to conclude that the Fairness Doctrine as enforced could not
accomplish its goals. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & PowE, supra note 20, at 262-63.
Finally, the agency rejected attempts to expand the scope of the doctrine. For
example, cases attempting to use the Fairness Doctrine broadly to go after what groups
perceived as "overall media bias" were unsuccessful because of the Commission's narrow
and licensee-protective interpretations of what constituted a controversial issue of public
importance and what would be deemed to constitute balance. See Am. Sec. Council Educ.
Found. v. CBS, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 366 (1977), aff'd on reh'g en bane sub nom. Am. Sec.
Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Thomas J. Krattenmaker &
L.A. Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible
Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 169-70.
Similarly, when the FCC decided that the Fairness Doctrine would not be applied
to product advertising as such, it limited the degree to which regulation would be used to
challenge the dominance of consumerism on radio and television. See Handling of Pub.
Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. Interest Standards of the Commc'ns Act, 48
F.C.C.2d 1, 12, 21-25 (1974) (Fairness Report), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for
Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Fairness Report].
Earlier, the Commission had applied the Fairness Doctrine to cigarette advertising. See
WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), aff'd sub norn. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1098-
99 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Thereafter, the Commission faced complaints about viewpoints
implied in entertainment programs and advertising for products other than cigarettes. See,
e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (applying the
Fairness Doctrine to advertising of high-powered cars). Faced with a potentially daunting
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Commission did not consistently enforce its rules, the Commission's
rhetoric suggests that it had revised its notion of community from a
hypothetical "average" audience connected as a national community by
radio and television networks to a more fragmented alternative whose
interests would have to be addressed were the medium to fulfill its mission.
Why did the Commission move in the direction of community
responsiveness? 88 One explanation is that the Commission became more
concerned about the potential constitutional conflict that its own direct
intervention in programming might cause. Many of the administrative and
judicial rulings during this period emphasize the importance of
broadcasters' expressive freedom. 89  Thus, the highly micromanaging
ascertainment rules could be seen as a proxy for more direct FCC content
regulation. In other words, the agency instead sought to engage in
"architectural censorship"-namely, regulating content indirectly by
requiring stations to meet procedural ascertainment requirements which the
agency believed would likely lead to sufficient public interest
programming.9" At a minimum, using structural regulations and procedural
requirements as proxies for more direct content regulation would likely
reduce the First Amendment scrutiny to which the Commission's rules
would be subjected. 9' In addition, more objective criteria for assessing
task of applying the doctrine to all product advertisements-because implicit viewpoint
claims could be made about many-the Commission stated that entertainment programming
and commercials would be generally exempt from the Fairness Doctrine unless they
explicitly and intentionally sought to express viewpoints on controversial issues of public
importance. See Fairness Report, supra, at 12, 21-25.
Whether it believed that programming responsive to the issues and concerns of
particular community groups would be likely to lead to overall programming balance on
controversial issues, whether it began to harbor doubts about the community-creating effects
of balanced programming, or whether it began to look at the overall market, the FCC's
ambivalence toward the Fairness Doctrine at this time is consistent with a move away from
the undifferentiated general audience to a recognition of multiple communities with
potentially different and conflicting interests.
88. There have been several very useful accounts of FCC regulation that have focused
on political accounts of FCC behavior. See, e.g., KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 43.
The account presented in this Essay does not reject the political story. It simply chooses a
different focus.
89. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973)
("Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. The presence of
these risks is nothing new."); see also Comm'n Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2306
(1960) (Report and Statement of Policy) (en banc) ("The communication of ideas by means
of radio and television is a form of expression entitled to protection against abridgement by
the First Amendment to the Constitution.").
90. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
669 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Architectural Censorship]. See also Cole & Murck, supra
note 56, at 358 (contending that the FCC wished to create a regulatory regime "which, if
complied with, would effectively (but indirectly) compel broadcasters to do something
which the FCC could not obligate them to do").
91. See Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 90, at 715-23 (arguing that under
[60:4
THE FOUR ERAS OF FCC PUBLIC INTEREST REGULA TION
broadcasters' compliance with their public interest mandates could also
silence criticisms about the vagueness and inconsistency of the
Commission's public interest programming decisions. After all, observers
note that "[b]eginning in the early 1960s, federal administrative agencies
were under attack from a wide variety of critics." 92 Finally, procedurally
grounded objective standards could in principle create broadcasters'
accountability to the community itself.
93
Another consistent explanation for the Commission's switch to process
and representation focuses on the increasing visibility of issue-oriented
community groups during this period.94 In addition to the judicial
invitation given to private attorneys general by the D.C. Circuit's decision
in United Church of Christ,95 the skirmish over renewal standards in
Congress in the 1970s96 as well as increasing social sensitivity to issues
facing minorities would doubtless have sensitized the Commission to the
existence of different perspectives on social issues held by different
community groups. It would have been difficult for the Commission to be
blind to the ways in which the decade of the 1970s challenged (as well as
reinforced) national narratives. Yet, just as the challenges posed by
current precedent, proxy content regulation would be unlikely to be subjected to strict
constitutional scrutiny, but contending that it should be).
92. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in
the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1149 (2001).
93. An alternative explanation is that the FCC, captured by the broadcast industry,
changed its rules and adopted a highly proceduralist approach in order to make it easier for
broadcast licensees to meet their obligations. The ascertainment rules were quite clear, after
all, as opposed to general statements about programming obligations in prior Commission
guidelines, and would therefore be easy to comply with, at least formally. Arguably, if the
ascertainment rules were seen as purely formal and not ever taken seriously by the agency,
then broadcasters would not have taken them seriously either in deciding upon their public
interest programming. On the other hand, Commission inaction could not be guaranteed
and potential sanctions were fearsome. Moreover, broadcasters' complaints about the
onerous burdens imposed on the industry by the ascertainment rules suggest that stations in
fact expended resources on the ascertainment process and perhaps even took it seriously.
94. See KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 36-41 (discussing examples of
community groups which successfully negotiated for "stronger representation in
broadcasting" for various ethnic and racial groups, better program balance in advertising,
certain amounts of ad-free children's programming, and other community interests) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
95. Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC II1), 707 F.2d
1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also PRICE, supra note 22, at 165-66 (discussing the public
interest movement); Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative
Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1389 (2000)
[hereinafter Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Policy] (describing the move from
interest group pluralism to participatory administration).
96. In 1969, public outrage and claims of racism derailed a bill providing that the FCC
could not consider competing applications for broadcast licenses unless it first found that
renewal of the incumbent's license would not be in the public interest. See KRASNOW &
LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 114-19.
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immigration in the 1920s led to the adoption of national narratives of
assimilation, the social developments of the 1970s required some
recognition of diversity. Nevertheless, while the Commission appeared to
recognize the conflicting views and interests of various groups during this
time, it nevertheless sought to use the media as educative tools that would
promote unity in a diverse community. 97 A process-oriented regulatory
regime that required broadcasters to hear the different voices of their
communities is reminiscent of the "safety valve" theory of the First
Amendment: social fragmentation can be avoided if different voices are
98heard and responded to by mainstream institutions.
The effect of this shift in its public interest orientation was to reduce
direct control by the FCC in broadcasters' content choices. While the
Commission still purported to obligate licensees to program in the public
interest, broadcasters were put in the position of having to negotiate
programming with community groups if they were to comply with the
agency's procedural rules. It is true that because of the Commission's
timid record on performance assessments during this period, its apparent
ambivalence about involvement in broadcast content, and perhaps its
capture by the regulated broadcast industry, 99 broadcasters were not often
held accountable to the FCC. Judicial intervention took up some of the
regulatory slack, however: it was principally through judicial intervention
that public interest programming purportedly responsive to community
issues was promoted. With the D.C. Circuit's recognizing for the first time
the right of interest groups to challenge FCC action1°0 and articulating a
doctrine of "hard look" review for administrative decisions,101 the Judiciary
97. See generally Ascertainment Primer, supra note 81.
98. For sources discussing the safety valve rationale for First Amendment protection,
see, for example, THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970);
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
884-86 (1963); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
99. Many have accused the FCC of having been captured by broadcasters. E.g.,
KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 23, 31-35; and Varona, Changing Channels, supra
note 9, at 78-85, and sources cited therein. For the classic explication of agency capture,
see MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79-82,
86-97 (1955).
100. See, e.g., Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC1), 359
F. 2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); and Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC
(UCC 11), 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
101. See, e.g., Citizens Commc'ns Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For
a description of the D.C. Circuit's "hard look" review, see, for example, Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.) (stating that a
reviewing court should "intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or
bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes
aware ... that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems"). For
more on hard look review, see Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise, supra note 92; Matthew
Warren, Note, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of Hard Look
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attempted to infuse more transparency into the administrative process 10 2
and created the possibility of judicialized interest-group pressure on the
Commission and broadcasters.
C. The Market Approach
As has been extensively described by others, the FCC's vision in the
1980s turned deregulatory, 0 3 pursuant to the views of Chairman Mark
Fowler and the Reagan Administration ideology. 10 4 During this period, the
FCC eliminated the detailed ascertainment rules, 10 5  the Fairness
Doctrine, 106  many license-renewal requirements, 10 7  and structural
regulations designed to promote diversity of programming.' 0 8  The
Commission ceded control of broadcast programming formats to the
market. 10 9 The agency also clarified that it no longer required licensees "to
Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002).
102. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity, supra note 95
(showing connections between regulatory agencies, the courts, and pluralist theories of
politics in the mid-twentieth century).
103. See, e.g., Varona, Out of Thin Air, supra note 7, at 158-59.
104. Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982); see also PRICE, supra note 22, at 167 ("The
economic metaphor of the market-place gained immense power, such power that the former
construct (ascertainment, content requirements, and fairness) virtually became an object of
ridicule.").
105. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), aff'd in part and remanded in
part, Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir.
1983) [hereinafter Radio Deregulation Order]; Deregulation of Radio, 96 F.C.C.2d 930
(1984) (Second Report and Order); Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Deregulation of Radio, 104 F.C.C.2d 505 (1986);
Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements,
and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984), recon. denied, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub
nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (eliminating
formal requirements for the ascertainment of community needs and obligations to maintain
program logs).
106. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-50
(1987), recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
107. The Commission simplified the renewal process during this period, including
elimination of program-related questions that had been part of the prior process. See
ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 117, and sources cited therein. In fact, the Commission
adopted a "postcard renewal" system during this period. See Radio Broadcast Services;
Revision of Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM,
FM, and Television Licensees, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,236 (May 11, 1981) (Report and Order); see
also Varona, Changing Channels, supra note 9, at 27-28 (describing deregulation).
108. See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership
of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,877, 31,887 (Aug. 9, 1984)
(eliminating the "seven station" rule-which had prohibited any person from holding
interests in more than seven stations in the same broadcast service).
109. The Commission decided to leave entertainment program format choices--classical
or rock, for example-to the licensees, even if a licensee's proposed format change would
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be responsive to issues facing the entire community or facing every
significant group in the community; instead, the broadcasters may focus on
the needs of their own audiences if they can show that other stations are
providing adequate service for the other groups." 110  The by-then-
traditional notion that each station had public interest obligations to all the
groups in its license area was superseded by an approach that looked at the
availability of issue-oriented programming across an entire market.
This is the era of communications policy during which the market was to
replace both the FCC and political groups as the determinant of the public
interest. The Commission began explicitly to think of the broadcast
audience as consumer rather than citizen. This market focus shifted the
meaning of the public interest to what the public found interesting-clearly
a shift to the preferences of individual viewers or listeners instead of some
notion of programming for community needs. Although the Commission
still purportedly used "community responsiveness" as its metric for
licensee performance, the notion of responsiveness-or at least the ways in
which responsiveness would be measured-had changed. Such
responsiveness was to be measured by general market acceptance rather
than programming to respond to the subcommunity interests identified by
polling community groups. Consumer satisfaction would be more
accurately measured by objective market metrics than FCC assumptions.
The shift from ascertained community needs to Nielsen ratings as
determinants of the public interest focuses less on the concerns of identity
and community groups than on the media-content preferences of
individuals within consumption-related demographic categories. 11 In a
world in which broadcasting still represented the mass media and
programmed for the common denominator, and in which networks were
still powerful, broadcasters' programming choices would generate
majority-preferred programming rather than satisfy the interests of the
eliminate a unique format in the market. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held instead that the
Commission should, in certain circumstances, hold hearings to inquire whether continuation
of the old formats would serve the public interest. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v.
FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v.
FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Present
Programming of the "Voice of the Arts in Atlanta on WGKA-AM and FM" v. FCC, 436
F.2d 263, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court affirmed the agency's decision,
holding that the agency's policy was consistent with the Communications Act and that at
least in the area of entertainment programming, the Commission could reasonably conclude
that the market was a better measure of the public interest than FCC regulation. FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981).
110. UCClll,707F.2dat 1421.
111. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 513
(2000) ("[T]he idea that broadcasters show 'what viewers want' is a quite inadequate
response to the argument for public interest obligations.").
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minority of viewers and listeners or those of underserved identity groups. 112
The FCC justified its deregulatory turn by relying on the failure of the
old public interest regulatory approach to achieve its aims, the need to
reduce the power of government, concerns about the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters, the enhanced availability of media other than
broadcasting, the end of spectrum scarcity, and the failure of regulatory
arguments grounded on broadcast exceptionalism. 1 3 Broadcasters took up
the mantle of the First Amendment in litigation, pointed to the
extraordinary efflorescence of other media, and sought to portray
themselves as classic speakers akin to newspapers. 14
The deregulatory "purge of the 1980s left commercial broadcasters with
very few tangible public interest programming obligations."' 15  The
narrowing focus on the individual media consumer as the object of
regulation meant the Commission was reluctant to exercise the regulatory
discretion permitted by Red Lion to promote certain types of content to
satisfy community needs. During this period, most of the Commission's
deregulatory decisions met with judicial approval. In the 1990s, the courts,
which appeared increasingly to doubt the scarcity argument for exceptional
regulation of broadcasting, began to subject even structural regulation to
significantly more stringent constitutional scrutiny." 6  There were even
calls for the termination of the FCC." 7 This was a far cry from the early
days of radio in which there was unanimous agreement that the new
technology needed to be regulated with respect to content and quality in
order to meet its obligations to the audience.
112. See id at 515-16 (describing informational cascades that can mistakenly lead to
broadcaster homogeneity even with respect to majority audiences).
113. In a statement emblematic of these attitudes, then-Chairman Mark Fowler
described television as nothing more than "a toaster with pictures." Bernard D. Nossiter,
Licenses to Coin Money: The F.C.C. 's Big Giveaway Show, 241 NATION 402, 402 (Oct. 26,
1985) (quoting Fowler's comment). These were also some of the arguments used by the
Commission in its decisions to eliminate the Fairness Doctrine and deregulate radio. See
Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-50 (1987),
recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
114. For an important early description of the "ideological drift" of the First
Amendment during this period, see J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over
Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1993).
115. Varona, Out of Thin Air, supra note 7, at 159.
116. For a description and critique of this development, see BAKER, supra note 10, at
124-62.
117. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC
AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 4 (1997) ("It is time for fundamental change.
It is time for the Federal Communications Commission to go.").
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D. The Targeted Return to Public Interest Regulation
The FCC's regulatory approach to content regulation began to change in
the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically, the Commission commenced a limited
return to public interest programming requirements, increased its focus on
enforcement, adopted disclosure requirements about programming, and
experimented (quietly) with mixed regulatory models." 8 Simultaneously
with its increased regulatory interventions, however, the Commission
continued, and even expanded, deregulation in the media structure
context. "19
Substantively, the agency's regulatory focus narrowed to the needs of a
single constituency: content regulation targeted the protection of
children. 120  The Commission focused its attention on child-centered
programming regulation such as children's educational television
requirements 121 and limits on broadcast indecency. 122  While the public
118. The rationales for and limits to a return to a more regulatory model during this
period were articulated in law review articles by then-Chairman Reed Hundt. See, e.g.,
Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Television
Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089 (1996) [hereinafter Hundt, The Public's Airwaves]
(arguing for clear, limited and well-enforced public interest obligations).
119. See, e.g., Candeub, supra note 10, at 1555-62 (describing the history of FCC media
ownership rules).
120. Indeed, a more politically focused account would suggest that the FCC's regulatory
focus on children occurred at the behest of a constituency of social conservatives seeking to
use the trope of child protection to achieve certain broader social aims. A clear example of
regulation responsive to such interest group pressure is the current FCC's enhanced
indecency regime. Lili Levi, The FCC's Regulation of Indecency, 7 FIRST REPORTS 1
(2008), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.com/about.aspx?id= 19102.
121. In 1996, the Commission adopted guidelines for children's educational television
that defined such programming for the first time and that allowed broadcasters who aired
three hours of such programming per week to receive expedited staff-level approval of their
license renewal applications with respect to compliance with the Children's Television Act.
See Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,662
(1996). This educational "kid-vid" requirement was extended to digital broadcasters
thereafter. See Children's Television Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, 19
F.C.C.R. 22,943 (2004).
Accounts of what led to the adoption of the children's education processing
guidelines differ. For example, former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt focuses on
congressional concern about children's educational programming to justify the
requirements. See, e.g., Reed E. Hundt, Keynote Address, A New Paradigm for Broadcast
Regulation, 15 J.L. & CoM. 527, 539-47 (1996) [hereinafter Hundt, Keynote Address];
Reed Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public:
Requiring Clear Rules for Children's Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11, 17,
22-23 (1996). Former Commissioner Glen Robinson, on the other hand, recounts a more
political story:
The FCC's chairman sought to mollify critics of this "giveaway" [of a second
television channel to incumbent broadcasters in order to facilitate the digital
conversion] by insisting that the broadcasters ought to give something in return for
the new channel-specifically, educational children's television and free air time for
political candidates. The first was forthcoming. Faced with the possibility of having
to buy the second channel, the major networks agreed to provide at least three hours
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interest regulation at issue in Red Lion was regulation intended to enhance
mainstream public discourse, the new initiatives in public interest content
regulation today are more focused on cultural rather than political space.
123
Recently, the Commission also adopted a requirement of a quarterly filing
in which "television broadcasters must provide more information on the
local programming they are broadcasting and facilitate the public's access
to that information."' 124 While the requirement is simply a disclosure rule,
the structure of the required form can easily be read as an implicit return to
content suggestions by the FCC.
The agency procedurally increased its focus on the effectiveness of its
executive role by selective increases in the enforcement of its rules,
particularly in the area of indecency.1 25  The Commission also
experimented with a "play or pay" regulatory regime in the context of
children's educational television.1 6  Finally, the agency has engaged in
per week of children's educational programs.
Robinson, supra note 20, at 918-19. Professor Robinson also concludes that "[t]he new
children's television rules are not really predicated on scarcity; they are the product of a deal
between the broadcasters and the FCC in which three hours of children's television is
exchanged for an exemption from the emerging movement for selling radio spectrum." Id.
at 930.
For histories of the Commission's approach to children's television, see, for example,
NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN,
TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17-57 (1995); Angela J. Campbell, Lessons from
Oz: Quantitative Guidelines for Children's Educational Television, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT L.J. 119, 137-49 (1997); James J. Popham, Passion, Politics and the Public Interest:
The Perilous Path to a Quantitative Standard in the Regulation of Children's Television
Programming, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 2-8 (1997).
122. See, e.g., Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing
of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004) (holding that
NBC's airing of an expletive during the awards show violated federal law, and notifying
broadcasters that future airings of the same word could result in enforcement action). See
generally LEVI, supra note 120 (providing an overview of the FCC's regulation of
indecency).
123. Of course, § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 still imposes on broadcasters
the obligation to provide "equal opportunities" to political candidates in the purchase of
political advertising time, and § 312(a)(7) provides federal political candidates a right of
"reasonable access" to purchase advertising time.
124. News Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Requires Television Broadcasters to
Provide More Local Programming Information to the Public (Nov. 27, 2007),
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines.html; see also Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure
Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, 23 F.C.C.R.
1274 (2008) (Report and Order) (noting the adoption of new reporting requirements).
125. See generally LEVI, supra note 120 (describing FCC's indecency regulation
regime).
126. See Lili Levi, In Search of Regulatory Equilibrium, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1321,
1339-42 (2007) (describing children's educational television rules, which permit
broadcasters to pay for educational programming to air on other stations in the market under
certain circumstances). The FCC's website does not disclose instances of broadcasters
taking advantage of the pay-or-play option for children's educational programming,
however, so little can be said about the design or specifics of the model.
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indirect public interest regulation via merger conditions or settlement
agreements. 1
27
One plausible explanation for this regulatory shift is that the 1980s and
1990s reflect the different economic and social faces of the political right
during that time. Conservatives in favor of economic deregulation often
also favored social regulation to promote family values. But these
regulatory initiatives were embraced during both Democratic and
Republican administrations. Another possible explanation is that, while the
majority of the Commission still hews to a market-based regulatory
approach, both Democratic and Republican appointees have become
convinced that the market does not adequately represent the needs and
preferences of children in broadcasting and thus that this segment of the
audience has to be the focus of its regulatory attention.
There are two ways to characterize today's targeted regulatory era. On
the one hand, the narrowness of the Commission's regulatory focus
differentiates it from the melting pot era. Children have become the
principal protected constituency for the Commission. The regulations are
targeted and not focused on programming as a whole. The Commission
does not justify its involvement by referring to the general listening public
or its need for radio as an instrument of democracy. Also, the Commission
has insisted since the mid-i 990s that its substantive definition of the public
interest is not based on its own choices or expertise, but on decisions made
by Congress and the American public.
28
Despite these apparent differences, however, there is a second way to
characterize the FCC's current regulatory approach-as a sub rosa revival
of the melting pot era during which the Commission sought to promote a
certain type of community identity. In other words, a narrow, targeted set
of regulations can be Trojan horses for enhanced government control over
expressive boundaries more generally. For example, indecency regulation
has shown that it is precisely the Commission, using its "collective
experience and knowledge, developed through constant interaction with
lawmakers, courts, broadcasters, public interest groups and ordinary
citizens, to keep abreast of contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium," that determines whether the "average broadcast viewer
127. On settlements in the indecency context, see LEVI, supra note 120, at 19-21.
128. For such a position with respect to children's educational programming, see
generally Hundt, The Public 's Airwaves, supra note 118; Hundt, Keynote Address, supra
note 121. As for indecency, the current Commission has sought to characterize itself as a
reluctant regulator drafted by Congress and the public. See Lili Levi, Chairman Kevin
Martin on Indecency: Enhancing Agency Power, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 19 (2007) [hereinafter
Levi, Chairman Kevin Martin on Indecency], available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v60/no I FLeviForumFinal.pdf
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or listener" would find broadcast material indecent. 29 Thus, the divination
of the American public's views is left to the discretion of the Commission.
It is the Commission that determines whether a particular depiction or
description of a sexual activity is either necessary to the program or
gratuitous and pandering, thereby putting the government in the position of
second-guessing the producers' editorial judgments.1 30  Moreover, the
current indecency regime demonstrates excessive responsiveness to the
complaints of the Parents Television Council, a particular decency
advocacy group.1 31 Thus, the market of the 1980s has been supplanted in
some content areas with the views of organized issue advocacy groups.
This differs not only from the deregulatory market era, but from the
earlier community representation era, during which the broadcasters' public
interest programming was likely to have been negotiated to some degree
with community groups representing local communities and
subcommunities. Now, those organic communities' views and interests are
replaced by the pressure brought to bear on the FCC by specific issue
advocacy groups. Hand in hand with such advocacy groups and under the
guise of the protection of children, the Commission can attempt to define
the boundaries of expressive culture on a national basis. In doing so, it is
returning to the earliest regulatory era, in which the Commission regulated
pursuant to a substantive vision of the public interest. At that time, the
FRC believed that the public interest was an interest in public cohesion
through the medium of radio and that dissenting voices or those too
identified with particular groups would undermine the assimilationist
project. Now, the FCC is seeking to police the boundaries of what
expression is properly public while deflecting criticism by relying on the
uncontroversial slogan that we need to protect our children.' 32
129. Infinity Radio License, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 5022, 5026 (2004).
130. LEVI, supra note 120, at 44.
131. See id. at 36 & n.215 (asserting that certain interest groups have "dominat[ed]
indecency enforcement").
132. Is this criticism mooted by the recent judicial rejections of aspects of the
Commission's new indecency regime? The government has been granted certiorari in a
case about the propriety of the agency's decision to find a violation of its indecency rules on
the basis of a fleeting expletive uttered outside the indecency safe harbor period. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647
(2008); see also CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008) (vacating and remanding
FCC indecency sanctions). It is possible that the Court may revert to the deferential
approach of prior broadcasting cases. In addition, there are aspects of the Commission's
current regulatory approach that have not been-and are unlikely to be-tested in court.
Judicial review has largely been avoided by negotiated resolutions between the Commission
and the affected broadcast parties. This is true not only in the context of indecency but also
of children's educational programming. Arguably this is not a major problem because the
rules would likely pass First Amendment muster anyway, even if they had been subjected to
judicial review. Indeed, it may be that the final rules were structured as they were precisely
in order to withstand constitutional review. Nevertheless, the Commission's penchant both
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III. READING THE HISTORY
What lessons do the different regulatory experiments of the four eras
teach US? 133 The first era, the melting pot approach, led to FCC decisions
designed to promote a national narrative. It was an approach consistent
with what were viewed as the assimilationist needs of its time. It valorized
the FCC's expertise, overly involved the government in broadcast content,
sought to minimize audience diversity, led to an excessive reliance on
commercial national network programming, maintained an illusion of a
homogeneous, melting pot culture, and led to structural decisions that
would undermine a noncommercial broadcasting model. In seeking to
promote a shared national culture, the melting pot approach made
constitutive normative choices.
The second era, community representation, seemed to reflect the
recognition that diversity narratives were necessary if electronic mass
media were to remain socially relevant and influential during this period of
social ferment. Yet this era too reflected ambivalence on the part of the
Commission. Its recognition of diversity to some degree conflicted with its
commitment to balanced presentation as the ideal form of electronic public
discourse. In any event, its rules in fact gave too much leeway to
broadcasters' claims that they had in fact programmed for the community
interests they had identified. The Commission's approach may have often
led to the illusion of representation rather than true community
participation. The Commission's unwillingness to look closely at the
broadcasters' claims that their performance met their promises surely
undermined the effectiveness of this kind of more localized community
model. Even had it been effective, however, such a community
representation model would have raised broader questions about whose
views and interests were represented and how to determine the right
balance between focused and generalized public interest programming.
In shifting its understanding of the public interest from the community's
concerns to the individual consumer's preferences, the third, "market" era
overly mythologized and valorized the market, did not pay adequate
attention to the negative externalities of broadcaster choices designed to
satisfy majority audience preferences, and often erred in its definitions and
measurements of the markets. One external critique of the market focus is
that the market neither adequately represented the nonmercantile interests
in the 1990s and now to regulate by agreement and avoid judicial review is troubling.
133. The discussion in text focuses on interpreting the goals and identifying the
weaknesses of the FCC's doctrinal developments during the period broadly surveyed. Other
approaches as well, such as more explicitly political explanations, could enrich the analysis,
but do not eliminate the usefulness of looking at shifts in doctrinal trends. E.g.,
Commission Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2313 (1960) (en banc).
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implicated in the public interest nor the exogenous character of consumer
preferences. 34 But even if one were to accept the 1980 FCC's belief in the
market as the right standard for the public interest, one could still engage in
an internal critique: the Commission's market rhetoric was suspect because
the agency did not admit the degree to which the agency's market-
structuring decisions affected what was otherwise touted as an apolitical
metric and because it refused to address assertions of market failure.
Finally, however it is defined, the new era of targeted regulation is
extremely problematic as well. It is either a period in which the
Commission is narrowly focusing on a single constituency for defining the
public interest, or one in which FCC power is enhanced at the behest of
particular advocacy groups while the agency disclaims any affirmative role
other than representative of the public. 135  The Commission ironically
accompanied its renewed regulatory vigor in "cultural" contexts by
deregulation in the context of market structure. The shift from an attempt
to enhance the public sphere to a focus on the protection of the private
realm transforms the agency from an enabler of public discourse to an
enforcer of conservative social norms and word taboos. 136 The children's
educational television requirements are also subject to critique. 37  In
134. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1997). In Professor Sunstein's words,
There is a large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.
This is so especially in light of the character and consequences of the
communications market. One of the central goals of the system of broadcasting,
private as well as public, should be to promote the American aspiration to deliberative
democracy.
Sunstein, supra note 111, at 501.
135. Levi, Chairman Kevin Martin on Indecency, supra note 128; Levi, supra note 120,
at 36 & n.215.
136. Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 1711 (2007) (explaining
FCC's fleeting expletive prohibition as acquiescence in a word taboo).
That courts have recently struck down some of the most excessive applications of
the Commission's indecency regime is not to the contrary. After all, there is much still left
to the agency's indecency regulatory regime beyond what has been struck down, and the
courts have relied principally on administrative process to ground their reversals. See CBS
Corp., 535 F.3d at 167.
137. Some say that the rules impose a minimal obligation, that licensee compliance is
spotty, that the programs identified as educational do not in fact warrant the
characterization, that parents do not understand the identifying icons for children's
educational television, and that stations excessively preempt such programming in order to
air other, more profitable, fare. E.g., AMY B. JORDAN, Is THE THREE-HOUR RULE LIVING UP
TO ITS POTENTIAL? AN ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION FOR CHILDREN IN THE
1999/2000 BROADCAST SEASON (2000); Amy B. Jordan & Emory H. Woodard IV, Growing
Pains: Children's Television in the New Regulatory Environment, 557 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 83, 89 (1998); Amy B. Jordan, Public Policy and Private Practice:
Government Regulations and Parental Control of Children's Television Use in the Home, in
HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN & THE MEDIA 651 (Dorothy G. Singer & Jerome L. Singer eds.
2002); KELLY L. SCHMITr, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, REPORT No. 35, PUBLIC
POLICY, FAMILY RULES AND CHILDREN'S MEDIA USE IN THE HOME 10-11 (2000); EMORY H.
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addition, the Commission's recent endorsement of disclosure-based
regulation is a double-edged sword in light of the increasing use of
information by well-organized interest groups to press their own particular
visions of the public interest.' 38 If the Commission really has narrowed its
regulatory interests to children, then its regulatory choices are suspect as
ineffective. If, on the other hand, the Commission is trying to engage in
broad-based social regulation under the innocent guise of child protection,
then the current regulatory era is even more dangerous than the first.
Some say that enhanced regulation is the answer to perceived problems
with the media. There have been recent calls for the return of the Fairness
Doctrine. 39 By contrast, others say that the Fairness Doctrine was a failed
attempt to enhance public discourse 140 and that the FCC should retire from
active content regulation in the public interest. 41 Critics have even gone so
WOODARD IV & NATALIA GRjDINA, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, SURVEY SERIES
No. 7, MEDIA IN THE HOME 2000: THE FIFTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN
32-38 (2000). Moreover, little empirical work has been done to answer the question of
whether children's educational programming rules are truly necessary for over-the-air
broadcasters in today's media environment-in which both PBS and cable provide a
plethora of excellent children's programming.
138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
139. Despite criticism, bills to revive the Fairness Doctrine are often introduced in
Congress. E.g., Fairness and Accountability in Broadcasting Act, H.R. 501, 109th Cong.
(2005); Meaningful Expression of Democracy in America Act, H.R. 4710, 108th Cong.
(2004). There is a current legislative debate as to the reintroduction of the Fairness Doctrine.
See John Eggerton, McCain Backs Bill to Block Fairness Doctrine, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 29, 2007, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6456710.html
(describing legislative developments related to reintroduction of the Fairness Doctrine); see
also Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 845 (2008) (calling for the adoption of a new Fairness Doctrine).
140. For important critiques of the Fairness Doctrine, see, for example, BAKER, supra
note 10, at 195-97; KRATTENMAKER & PowE, supra note 20, at 237-75; LUCAS A. PoWE,
JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 108-20 (1987); Henry Geller,
Broadcasting and the Public Trustee Notion: A Failed Promise, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 87 (1987); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 20, at 933-39;
Krattenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today, supra note 87, at 151-52; Yoo, supra
note 20; see also Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a
"Chilling Effect"? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
279 (1997) (assessing the effects of the abolition of the Fairness Doctrine). But see Patricia
Aufderheide, After the Fairness Doctrine: Controversial Broadcast Programming and the
Public Interest, 40 J. COMM. 47, 68 (1990) (finding that the Fairness Doctrine did not cause
a chilling effect and that broadcasters during the Fairness Doctrine years provided more
balanced commentary than after the Fairness Doctrine's demise).
141. E.g., THE MEDIA INSTITUTE, RATIONALES AND RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere ed. 1997); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 48 (abr. student ed. 1965); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note
20; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY Vol. 4,
2374 (1973); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland.: Why the Public Trustee
Model of Broadcasting Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101 (1997); Robinson, supra note 20;
Varona, Changing Channels, supra note 9, at 18-26. See generally Hazlett, Physical
Scarcity, supra note 20, at 991; Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local, supra
note 42.
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far as to express doubt about whether the FCC could ever effectively
regulate in the public interest.
142
This Essay does not propose a defense of the FCC's attempts to regulate
broadcast content in the past: "The rules struck down or diminished had
hardly been a model of the public sphere."' 143 Critics are doubtless right
that the Commission's historical reluctance to enforce its program rules has
robbed the rules of their maximal power. They are also doubtless right that
when the Commission does decide to step up its enforcement, as is evident
in its current indecency initiatives, it can do so with disproportionate
stringency. Certainly, much of the literature that criticizes the agency for
its "revolving door" relationship with its regulated industries, for its party-
line decisions, for its responsiveness to political pressure (from the
Executive, Congress, and private lobbying groups), and for its
timorousness in promoting innovation raises important questions about the
wisdom of proposing a return to public interest content regulation.144 So do
the arguments that characterize the Commission as structurally, politically,
and ideologically limited, inclined toward the mainstream, and hostile to
more radical challenges.
145
Despite the persuasiveness of these complaints, however, it is not clear
that the Commission would inevitably fail if it experimented with different
public interest goals and regulatory methods. 46 In any event, objections
based on regulatory failure "presuppose elusive criteria [to assess
performance], and the baseline question remains: Compared to what?"'147
Moreover, there remains the question of available choices. Promises that
new technology-and the Internet in particular-will make extinct the need
142. As Henry Geller, media theorist and former FCC General Counsel, has recently put
it, "[t]he lesson to be drawn from this [FCC] history is that behavioral content regulation is
simply unworkable in this sensitive First Amendment area." Henry Geller, Carl Ramey's
Mass Media Unleashed, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 391, 392 (2008) (reviewing CARL R. RAMEY,
MASS MEDIA UNLEASHED: How WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS SHORTCHANGED THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC (2007)). Similarly, Professor Varona, a speaker at this Symposium, has
argued that there are three fundamental obstacles to effective FCC content regulation. See
Varona, Out of Thin Air, supra note 7, at 163-72; see also Varona, Changing Channels,
supra note 9, at 53-89.
143. PRICE, supra note 22, at 167. The agency's principles "were often meaningless and
harassing, and enforcement was haphazard." Id.
144. But see CROLEY, supra note 16 (critiquing a public choice approach to the
regulatory state).
145. BAKER, supra note 10, at 196-97; KRATTENMAKER, supra note 20.
146. See, e.g., Candeub, supra note 10, at 1611 (explaining weaknesses of the FCC's
justifications of the media ownership rule and calling for regulations to enhance news
production); Sunstein, supra note 111. For a recent criticism of libertarian arguments
against FCC public interest regulation, see, for example, Gregory P. Magarian, Market
Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access
Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373 (2007).
147. CROLEY, supra note 16, at 297.
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for public interest regulation to promote the public sphere are overstated. 148
The plethora of communicative conduits available today has not in fact led
to a flourishing of traditional professional journalism. If technology does
not erase the need for attention to the public sphere, and if market structure
often leads to an underproduction of serious news programming, then is it
wise to reject from the outset an experiment with a different type of
regulatory regime in the public interest attuned to those concerns?
149
A final observation about where we find ourselves. Administrative
agencies have predictable incentives to maintain and even increase power.
The past several years of FCC activity have shown that both Congress and
the Commission understandably seem reluctant to give up the discretion
granted the agency by the public interest standard in the communications
acts. It may be that the Commission is now politicized to such a degree
that it would reverse its regulatory stance if the object of regulation were to
be switched to something other than the child protection initiatives favored
by social conservatives. On the other hand, the agency's regulatory
direction could presumably be influenced by other constituencies as well.
Just as the early broadcasters asked to be subject to government regulation
in order to protect themselves from ruinous interference,' 50 industry views
on the kinds of regulation proposed in this Essay are likely to influence the
Commission's direction. Moreover, at least some members of the
Commission have sought to expand the agency's regulatory footprint in
order to promote diversity of viewpoints.' 5' A change in presidential
148. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 10, at 88-123. For another dystopian view of the
impact of the Internet on community, see CASS R. SUNSTEtN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007)
149. I admit to a number of contestable assumptions imbedded in and questions raised
by this proposition. For example, what constitutes "serious" journalism? How do we know
that there has been an "underproduction" of such journalism in the mainstream electronic
media? Is it not true that regulatory "experiments" often serve either as opportunities for the
exercise of discretionary government power against preferred targets or threats in regulatory
negotiations?
In addition, theorists have argued that alternatives exist to content regulation in the
public interest by the FCC. See, e.g., Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 20. Some who
do not call for spectrum propertization suggest abandoning FCC content regulation of
commercial broadcasters and replacing current regulation with various subsidy proposals
whereby commercial broadcasters would be assessed spectrum usage fees or otherwise fund
public broadcasting or Internet access. See, e.g., Henry Geller, Promoting the Public
Interest in the Digital Era, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 515 (2003); Varona, Out of Thin Air, supra
note 7, at 186-90. This Essay does not address those options, except to note that public
broadcasting itself would not resolve the problems identified above and that the inquiry
proposed here is not inconsistent with funding-based attempts to enhance public
broadcasting and Internet access. So long as the mass electronic media are still most
people's preferred media for news, I believe it is worthwhile to explore whether the
Commission can help promote journalistic activities and news and public affairs
programming by broadcast outlets.
150. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 20, at 931.
151. Commissioners Copps and Adelstein, for example, have argued in favor of more
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administration could also influence the Commission's commitments.152 At
least in one reading of broadcast history, the current Commission is
engaging in aggressive attempts to structure both an economically
deregulated marketplace and a speech environment whose boundaries are
set by an agency representing the views of only one segment of the public
while purporting to do nothing more than protect children. We are
currently in uncertain times with respect to media policy, but the
Commission is unlikely to fold its regulatory tent in the near future.
IV. A PROPOSED DIRECTION FOR FUTURE PUBLIC INTEREST
PROGRAMMING: PROMOTING JOURNALISM
Assuming that the Commission's regulatory bent will continue at least
for the near term, and keeping in mind the critiques catalogued above of
current regulatory targets, it is useful to address whether the history of
broadcast regulation suggests seeds of a different way to look at the public
interest today.1 53 This Essay proposes that if the Commission is to continue
attempting to regulate in the public interest, it should redirect its attention
in two ways.
First, the agency should shift its content focus from indecency and
children's programming back to the broader issue of the public sphere.
Specifically, the Commission should turn its attention to the need to shore
up journalistic values in the electronic press today, as this is a crucial
problem besetting the public sphere. 154  We currently face far greater
stringent regulation in the public interest. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Stuck in the Mud: Time to Move an Agenda to Protect America's
Children, Remarks Before the Media Institute 1 (June 11, 2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-282885A1.pdf (arguing that the
FCC needs to play a more effective and productive role to help parents insulate their
children from indecent and profane programming); Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at National Conference on Media Reform 1 (June 8, 2008),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-282800A I .pdf
(discussing the problems of unregulated media); Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at National Conference on Media Reform 1 (June 7, 2008)
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-28282 LA I .pdf
(charging that it is time to put the FCC "back on the beat").
152. Ira Teinowitz, Candidates' Differences on Media Outlined,
TV WEEK, July 23, 2008, available at
http://www.tvweek.com/news/2008/07/candidatesdifferences on medi.php (discussing
potential policy changes that may result from the election of either Barack Obama or John
McCain as President).
153. This discussion does not address those critiques of public interest regulation that
would dispense with it entirely. Rather, it deals with what we currently have in place and
whether a change in focus would be desirable. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to
suggest and evaluate particular initiatives.
154. Other scholars as well have discussed the importance of promoting independent
journalism. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 10, at 33-48; Candeub, supra note 10, at 1551
(focusing on amount of news produced); Magarian, supra note 139; see also Sullivan, supra
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challenges with respect tojournalistic commitments and professionalism in
the electronic media than the social concerns posed by fleeting expletives
on the air or the fact that more children's educational television can be
found on public broadcasting and cable than on the networks.
Second, the Commission should reject direct content prohibitions for all
the reasons that have been amply ventilated in the Fairness Doctrine and
indecency debates, and instead look to more elastic, regulatorily flexible
ways of promoting its desired outcomes. In other words, it should focus on
the possibilities of fee- or incentive-based regulation' 55-the carrot rather
than the stick-and structure' 56 rather than content as regulatory
approaches. '57
note 22, at 1664-66 (discussing the assumptions about journalistic professional judgments
that might underlie First Amendment rights granted by the Court to speech intermediaries).
155. For a discussion of incentive-based communications regulation for the production
of programming likely to be underproduced by the market, see Ellen P. Goodman, Media
Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital
Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391-92, 1461-65 (2004) ("The use of subsidies,
in the form of cash or non-cash incentives, permits government to pursue media political
goals across all media and with far less formidable First Amendment constraints."). Others
have suggested that the Commission impose spectrum fees on broadcasters and use such
fees to promote, inter alia, public broadcasting. E.g., Henry Geller, Promoting the Public
Interest, supra note 149, at 518. 1 too have argued for an indirect regulatory approach in a
prior article, proposing
(1) structural regulations designed to promote journalistic values; (2) a requirement
that broadcasters spend a certain percentage of their gross advertising revenues on
news and public affairs production and programming; (3) different options for
constructing a requirement that broadcasters devote a percentage of their advertising
time to advocacy advertising, for which they would be allowed to be paid a premium
over their ordinary commercial rates; and (4) audience empowerment, including
disclosure-oriented requirements designed to foster audience activism and strategies
to engage an audience whose attention is claimed by an unprecedented abundance of
content.
Levi, supra note 12, at 1324; see also id. at 1370-71.
156. On the connection between journalism and media concentration, see BAKER, supra
note 10. The overarching argument of Media Concentration and Democracy is roughly that
deconcentration of ownership promotes democracy not only in itself, but also to the extent
that it minimizes the possibility of demagogic power and enhances the likelihood of
resources' being devoted to improved journalism and the press's watchdog role.
157. There are various stories, with different emphases, that can be told about the
history of the FCC's past regulation of programming in the public interest. One is the story
of the political developments underlying agency action. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text. Another is the administrative state story, which focuses on the
relationship between regulatory agency, regulated industries, and the courts, and which
reads administrative law as developing from shifts in the courts' visions of the legitimacy of
pluralist accounts of politics. See, e.g., Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity, supra
note 95. Yet another is the regulatory approach story, about command-and-control
regulation and its alternatives as possible approaches to effective regulation. From
explorations of public-private governance models to models of responsive regulation and
the "co-regulatory" media initiatives of the EU, scholarly, legislative, and institutional
imaginations have been captured by alternatives to "command-and-control" regulation.
Outside the media area, the past decade has seen a profusion of "third way" literature that
touts public-private regulatory modalities as viable alternatives to traditional command-and-
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If we believe that good, serious, professional, independent journalism is
an important component of working democracy, it is important to
continually measure how well journalistic organs are fulfilling their
democracy-enhancing roles. 158  Evidence today casts doubt on both the
effectiveness and the credibility of current news purveyors. 159  Modem
journalism takes place in an environment of consolidation,
hypercommercialization, personalized and targeted advertising (and
attendant programming), a polarized, entertainment-driven modem news
culture, and attention scarcity. Journalists work in consolidated corporate
environments in which media interests are only one slice of the ownership
pie, in which shareholder profits are increasingly fetishized, in which
advertising is increasingly personalized and targeted, and in which
discourse is defined by entertaining extremes. 60  Despite utopian
expectations, the alternative media-noncommercial news sources, blogs,
control regulation. E.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY (1998); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 547-49 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371-404 (2004);
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 197, 199-200 (2006).
The FCC, in adopting its children's educational television rules in 1996, could be said to
have quietly flirted with a fledgling experiment in "third way" public-private governance.
Levi, supra note 12, at 1338-42. Previously, the agency's reliance on broadcaster self-
regulation can be interpreted as an underanalyzed version of the same. It may be that the
Commission's history of command without control and the unnoticed passing of its flirtation
with a "pay or play" children's television regulatory model suggest that such experiments
are unlikely to be successful, and that politics will derail alternatives to classic regulation in
media, as some critics would argue. Surely agency capture is a more complex phenomenon
when an agency regulates numerous different and competing industries. Politics too is more
complex when many powerful parties are involved, creating counterweights to one another.
Well-crafted structural regulations and incentive-based rule options are also less likely to
trigger judicial concern than did the closed and incumbent-favoring processes of the 1970s
FCC.
158. There are of course different views of what constitutes "good" and even
"independent" journalism. Different views ofjournalism can also be matched with different
theories of democracy, and therefore one's view of the right social order will influence the
types of journalistic norms one promotes. See C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens
Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 320-48 (1998) (describing the elitist, liberal pluralist, and
republican forms of democracy, and associated media). I do not mean to engage those
questions in this Essay, however. My principal points are that (1) at the very moment that
the FCC is busy stamping out fleeting expletives on broadcast channels during the day, any
view of democracy-enhancing journalism is being challenged by economic and social
developments; (2) one must be vigilant in assessing journalism on an ongoing basis; and (3)
it is conceivable (although, of course, far from certain given its history) that the FCC could
help the journalistic efforts of the electronic mass media. For a similar view that the FCC
can properly regulate to increase news, see Candeub, supra note 10.
159. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, supra note 2.
160. See Levi, A New Model, supra note 3 and sources cited therein. See generally
PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, supra note 2 (discussing the challenges of
developing a new business model for news media).
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and citizen journalists--do not displace the traditional mass media.' 6'
There is much to be said for a credible mainstream in electronic media
journalism. 162  Therefore, it is critical to incubate counterforces to the
developments that are undermining conventional professional press
163norms.
The proposed shift of the FCC's attention to the broadcaster's press
responsibilities is responsive to modem concerns about the preconditions
for democracy and consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of
broadcast licensees as journalists. It is true that the Court in Red Lion did
not particularly focus on broadcasters as members of the press engaging in
journalistic activity. 164 However, despite the Red Lion Court's explicit
rhetoric about broadcasters as licensees rather than journalists, its assertion
that Congress could limit licensees' freedom to engage in purely
commercial behavior is consistent with (and perhaps an invitation to) a
view of stations as engaging in journalism. After all, the Fairness Doctrine
161. See PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, supra note 2.
162. Historically, CBS distinguished itself from its competitors ABC and NBC by
establishing a reputation as the Tiffany network. See Clay Calvert, The First Amendment,
Journalism & Credibility: A Trio of Reforms for a Meaningful Free Press More Than Three
Decades After Tornillo, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 9, 16 (2005). All three networks had news
divisions; however,
Broadcasters through most of the period since 1934 responded to this perception of a
public interest affecting their business by occasionally trying to act like journalists.
The presence of a money-losing news department dignified a television network. It
was taken to constitute some sort of guarantee that the network understood its own
importance, and intended to respond benevolently to those who were dependent on it.
Privilege began noblesse oblige.
Moglen, supra note 23, at 951 (citation omitted). Although the current mass television
media environment is far different from the oligopolistic universe of the big three television
networks, query whether the profusion of possible options to capture the audience's
attention could not generate a renewed effort for brand identity. If so, then is there any way
the FCC can help promote a "market for credibility" within the mass media so that at least
some of the corporate media outlets perceive credible journalism as an economic plus and
seek to brand themselves as the reliable news source?
163. Cf Magarian, supra note 139 (arguing for a revival of a new version of the
Fairness Doctrine and calling for FCC rules "that would fortify journalistic ethical norms of
public service against interference by media owners and advertisers"). Professor Candeub
has argued in a parallel vein that the Commission should use the regulation of market
structure to enhance the amount of news produced and thereby aid the public in monitoring
its government. See generally Candeub, supra note 10.
164. In 1967, Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. opined that "[o]ne of the genuinely interesting
issues raised when we attempt to apply a First Amendment analysis to broadcasting is what
difference it makes that broadcasting has been essentially an entertainment medium." Harry
Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. L. & ECON. 15, 28
(1967). Perhaps the Red Lion Court too was captured by that view of broadcasters-they
were not principally speakers, but conduits for entertainment and others' speech. See also
LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 72-73 (1991) (noting Red Lion's description of
broadcasters as licensees and monopolies rather than as journalists or press organs).
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was intended to induce coverage of public issues and to promote norms of
balance-and perhaps even "objective journalism" in the electronic
medium. 6' The contrast highlighted in Red Lion was the right of the
public to hear and the right of the licensee to speak its personal economic
interest. But the right of the listener can be exercised both with access
systems and with the professional norms of journalism. The Court's
constitutional acceptance of the Fairness Doctrine is not inconsistent with
different available views of broadcasters, including the journalistic view, if
that is the rule adopted by the FCC.
Moreover, cases after Red Lion have emphasized the broadcaster's role
as press-even when, as in Arkansas Educational Television Network v.
Forbes, the licensee was a government rather than private speaker, the
Court upheld the station's editorial discretion to exclude a candidate from a
televised debate.' 66  In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee
167
(which rejected a general First Amendment right of access to the air for
editorial advertising) we can discern the Court's interest in promoting the
journalistic role of the broadcast licensee. There, the Court said the
following:
[I]t seems clear that Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to
develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public
obligations. Only when the interests of the public are found to outweigh the
private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will government power be
asserted within the framework of the Act.1
68
165. One could argue that the reading in text conflicts with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of what the First Amendment protects in the press in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, which struck down a right-of-reply statute for newspapers. 418
U.S. 241 (1974). After all, the Tornillo Court emphasized editorial freedom, and the
Fairness Doctrine enabled by the Red Lion Court seems to co-opt that editorial discretion.
The two cases do appear to take different positions on the balance of First Amendment
interests and differ in their degree of deference to the legislature. But first there are those
who would argue for a broadly interpreted Red Lion as the right approach to the First
Amendment, rather than the excessively autonomy-focused Tornillo. E.g., Baker, Turner
Broadcasting, supra note 24. Moreover, Professor Baker has characterized Tornillo as a
classic case in which the First Amendment precluded punishment for choosing to speak,
rather than as an acontextual adoption of absolute editorial autonomy as the key theme of
the First Amendment. See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 24, at 852 n.8 1; Baker,
The Media That Citizens Need, supra note 158 at 399; Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra
note 24, at 111-14. In addition, there is arguably a fundamental difference between the
access available to speakers in the print as opposed to the broadcast context. In Tornillo, the
Court could reasonably emphasize the editorial freedom of newspapers as the fundamental
First Amendment value because there was still generalized, unlicensed access to newsprint
and the public streets. Broadcasting, by contrast, created monopoly licensees selected by
the government and precluded generalized access for fear of chaos.
166. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
167. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
168. Id. at 110. While Red Lion found the Fairness Doctrine to be constitutionally
permissible, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee held that the First Amendment
did not mandate a general fight of access to the electronic press. Rather, the majority relied
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In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, even though the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of a limited right of access to broadcasters for federal
political candidates, the Court reaffirmed that Congress had conferred on
broadcasters "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public
duties. 169
This raises the following question: what, if anything, could the
Commission do to promote increases in the amount and quality of
journalistic programming on radio and television?1 70 This Essay does not
seek to make specific suggestions. It does warn against an automatic
continuation of historical forms of command-and-control content regulation
(such as the Fairness Doctrine)-not only because of free expression
concerns, but also because the history of such FCC regulation is best
described as command-without-control. Modestly, it suggests an inquiry
on the part of the Commission into how a regulatory approach that
promotes electronic journalism can be designed most consistently with
even a libertarian view of First Amendment doctrine. The inquiry could be
a springboard to a broad debate about our vision of the best use of mass
media today.
on the Fairness Doctrine to ensure sufficient balance in programming, and although the
Court in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981), found permissible the statutory right of
access granted to federal candidates for political advertising under § 312(a)(7), such access
rights were limited to a particular context and did not undermine the general role of the
licensee as a press organ. The access rights were for federal candidates to buy advertising
time, and did not hinge on any speech decision by the broadcaster. Moreover, the majority
in CBS, Inc. v. FCC made clear that the right of access would be interpreted by the FCC
primarily as an injunction against blanket prohibitions of time sales to federal candidates
and a requirement of individual negotiation. Id. at 388-89, 396-97.
169. CBS, Inc. FCC, 453 U.S., at 395 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973)); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596
(1981) (characterizing the Communications Act as recognizing journalistic discretion).
170. For a similar suggestion in a broader discussion of media reform, see Levi, In
Search of Regulatory Equilibrium, supra note 12. It is not the purpose of this Essay to make
microregulatory suggestions about future public interest regulation by the Commission. In a
thoughtful recent article, Professor Candeub articulates a similar point:
Rather than protect the number of "media voices," the FCC should protect the
essential function the media serves in a democracy-to minimize the difficulties
citizens face in monitoring government. . . . Media regulation should create
ownership structures that maximize the amount of political news, making it easier for
citizens to monitor government. . . .Media regulation must encourage industry
structures that maximize news output. Research about the effects of industry
ownership and geographic structure on the content of political news and political
activity could guide this regulation. Setting media structure to maximize news output
creates private incentive for certain types of media production but avoids
government's direct involvement in content decisions. Even as current media
structures shift, however, this Article argues the goal of maximizing political news
output with minimal government oversight must guide regulation. With changing
media industry structures, this maximization may involve using the tax exemption to
encourage political reporting.
Candeub, supra note 10, at 1551, 1611.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that the most useful lesson of Red Lion and
subsequent Supreme Court cases about broadcast content regulation is that
the Court is willing to defer to congressional and FCC decisions in the
context of regulating the communications commons. In turn, the exercise
of the Commission's discretion to regulate in the public interest has
reflected several different views of the regulator's role. At one end of the
regulatory spectrum, the Commission attempted to regulate content in order
to create and cement a homogeneous national narrative. At the other
extreme, the agency jettisoned community-building in favor of market-
supportive attention to individual viewers' tastes. Currently, we live in an
epoch of revived, targeted, but potentially expansive FCC regulatory
activity regarding content. This Essay proposes that the Commission shift
its focus from the purported protection of children to the protection of the
public sphere-a goal it has recognized as central to democracy since the
inception of radio regulation.
The protection of the public sphere is a tall order, however. When the
Commission has set itself the task of promoting a rich public sphere via
command-and-control content regulations, its work has been roundly
criticized as an abject failure by First Amendment analysts of all theoretical
schools. One option that has garnered praise is for the Commission to
retire from the business of regulating to promote the public interest in any
sense beyond the technical. The contrary possibility is that the agency
should revive its traditional content regulations such as the Fairness
Doctrine in order to improve public debate. A third alternative-proposed
in this Essay-is for the agency to reframe its understanding of public
interest regulation. Such refraining would entail exploration of possible
structural regulations to promote independent journalism, and
investigations of incentive- or fee-based content regulations to support that
goal. In view of the critical reduction of resources committed to
professional journalism in today's mass media, the extraordinary
fragmentation of audience attention enabled by current technology, and the
still-unique ability of "old" electronic media to serve as a universal conduit
of information and news for the entire public, modern media policy would
be well served if the FCC commenced a serious inquiry into the viability of
FCC interventions to enhance the journalistic activities of the electronic
media.
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